Friday, May 20, 2011

Voices from the Subaltern - Chapter Eight



Voices from the Subaltern
 

Education and Empowerment
Among Rural Dalit (Untouchable) Women

by
Moses Seenarine
Date: 1/31/99; Revised: 2/26/03

Chapter 8 - From the Ground Up : Recommendations
Introduction

The section contain a presentation of findings on respondents’ class status and MSK economic development programs, and contradictions in the empowerment processes. The findings reveal that the class status of respondents has remained the same, although as a consequence of their resistance and empowerment, there are notable changes in their caste status. Part three includes recommendations to the Mahila Samakhya program, women's development programs policy makers, and the Indian government respectively.

Organizing Women: Recommendations to the Mahila Samakhya Program

    The Mahila Samakhya program is funded by one of the most progressive donors in the international development and women's development fields; nonetheless, the program's development model needs to be challenged in order to improve its design and implementation.. The data reveals that the power and influence of the Mahila Samakhya Karnataka program in Bidar district varies over time. While the program initially served to inspire Dalit women to organise themselves, its very success led to political consequences, and subsequently to a “cooling off” phase.
    Despite a certain amount of back-pedalling and de-mobilisation of rural women, and the almost exclusive focus on analysing gender roles and identity, the program is leading to the unintended consequences among the women who are in addition taking on class and caste issues like land rights and cultural empowerment. Yet, the findings reveal that even after five years of active participation in activities organised by the Mahila Samakhya program in Karnataka, practically all of the respondents are below the poverty line.
    At the start of the project in 1989, program implementation in Bidar district was greatly facilitated by taking over an already existing local development program run by the privately owned organisation, AIKYA. By early 1991, the program was able to hold a huge meeting in which 1,200 women were involved, with 100 acting as ushers and caretakers. By incorporating AIKYA’s infrastructure and staff, the Bidar district program got implemented faster than the other two districts in the State.
    Nevertheless, this resulted in MSK's inability to act independently of AIKYA, which is further reinforced through the use of AIKYA as the main training agency. AIKYA’s director and staff are largely in control of the MSK program, determining what training program participants, teachers, and staff receive, rather than the MSK administrators themselves. Given the widespread existence of corruption within NGOs, discussed earlier, the funding of local programs needs to become more decentralised. Sanghas should be funded directly, which would free up the MSK district and state offices to provide support, training and evaluation, rather than having these diverse responsibilities become reduced to concerns over appropriation decisions at the district and state levels.
    The issue of caste is important, both in terms of program planners ignoring caste issues in policy and training, and in the dominance of caste Hindus employed as national, state and district level program administrators and staff. If the government continues to fund only those groups headed by "upper" castes and middle class women, then these already educated and privileged women will keep on benefiting the most from women's empowerment programs.
    Given the nature of class oppression and casteism in India, the program should make all effort to hire planners, administrators and staff from the same gender, class and caste background of program participants. Riano argues that any program or community process implementing participation goals ought to recognize the cultural and social forces underlying the dynamics of interaction in the community or group involved (1994). Multicultural insights need to inform feminist paradigms in women in development projects, as well as the reverse. This is not to say that Dalit women staff will not be autocratic, corrupt, or casteist themselves; or that non-Dalit women cannot become good administrators. There should be openness and procedures for accountability regardless of who is in charge. The point being made is that Dalit women staff may be more sympathetic to the problems of poor Dalit women.
    In support to the above, the lone Dalit woman district administrator and the few Dalit Sahayoginis, teachers and Sangha leaders, have all been the most successful in terms of organising local Dalit women, since they are perceived as being similar to program participants, not some government officer or social worker. Nevertheless, it is important that the women democratically elect their leaders themselves, like the Women's Federation model.
    Although respondents are generating their own curriculum when they get together, the program should employ Dalit educators to write a more relevant curriculum, instead of using the government's textbooks in its educational programs. While MSK's recruitment policy have served to reinforce caste differences at the local level, significantly, in meetings when the women get together, they are ignoring caste differences. Instead of highlighting distinctions among Dalit women by recruiting women from specific SC and ST colonies, rural women's development programs should try to encourage and organise all Dalit and Adivasi women who are willing to participate in the program.
    Like the Women's Development Program (WDP) discussed earlier, MSK has a hidden family planning agenda in the guise of "women's empowerment”. It seems that whenever the women organise themselves enough to gain some political leverage against class and caste injustice, the program always backs away from these issues. This implies that program policies and staff are not really interested in empowering the poor, but in channelling disadvantaged women’s energies into non-threatening pursuits by restricting their activities to literacy, savings and small scale businesses.
    While there is the need for people to empower themselves, nevertheless, the women cannot do it all on their own. At a minimum, there needs to be in place various forms of networks and support that isolated rural women can rely on to help them present their grievances to relevant authorities and through the courts.
    Despite the rhetoric of MSK policy and program planners, there is an absence of decision making power allowed to program participants in MSK, who cannot be empowered from the top-down. This shows that the language of empowerment as used by MSK is meant only in theory, not for practice. There needs to be more accountability of administrators to program participants built into these programs, especially at the national and state levels where most of the important decisions are made. Empowerment as a process not only requires a new thinking of people's participation and decision making, but correspondingly a new way of structuring organisations that sets out to empower others, with emphasis placed on decentralisation and maintaining a flat, horizontal, circular structure as opposed to hierarchical, vertical ones.
    Similar to the MSK program, an evaluation of the Bidar district’s Total Literacy Campaign found that neoliterates have mixed feelings about the role of volunteers and officials of the program, and that there are more difficulties in preserving the gains already made by neoliterates. If follow up action is not taken up immediately, the gains may not be consolidated, and the entire effort put in the campaign would become in vain (Karnataka Cultural and Educational Development Trust 1994). More long-term NFE projects could provide the necessary time and support for educationally underprivileged women to not only learn functional literacy skills, but enable them moreover to be able to compete on equal terms in higher education and white-collar employment.

Micro-Credit: Recommendations to Women in Development Policy Makers
    Although globalisation is usually characterised as a homogenising force, it "fuses with local conditions in diverse ways, thereby generating, not eroding, striking differences among social formations" (Bahl 1997:1342). This means that far from replacing "traditional" norms and forms of control with more modern, "egalitarian" ones, capitalism's increasing encroachment into the rural economy is reinforcing traditional sources of wealth, power, and prestige, and contributing to the maintenance of mechanisms for exclusionary and discriminatory practices.
    Consequently, it is the case that in many low income countries, the most disadvantaged segment of the population, poor women, are forced to bear the brunt of national, economic growth-oriented strategies in terms of contributing both free domestic labour and underpaid wage labour, and experiencing decreased economic and social status as the country readjusts to demands of the global economy. Concurrently, poor women's bodies are also blamed in part for the failure of economic growth policies as long as their fertility leads to increased population growth and thereby affects the gross domestic product per capita.
    As a consequence, micro credit and small scale business development schemes are becoming popular as a poverty reduction strategy for governments, donor agencies, and NGOs. This model of poor women's empowerment is opposite to models which emphasise organising strategies, such as a women's union. Empowerment must mean more than micro-enterprise, entrepreneurial self-reliance and justifications for limiting the state's provision of welfare services and employment.
    The findings show that training for micro credit schemes is not enough to empower women, since the women face many obstacles in getting access to land, business loans, markets, and customers. Even if women are able to borrow small business loans (Rs. 10,000 or $US 300), it is difficult to turn these small loans into a profitable enterprise.     Moreover, small business programs encourage women to make consumer products for trendy world markets, such as silk garments, garlands, rugs and baskets. Such programs fail to acknowledge that these markets are subject to rapid changes, driven by the fashion industry, advertising, and popular culture, and poor women are not provided with further training or capital to constantly re-adjust to these rapid changes. If women are going to spend more time engaged in these capitalist enterprises, supports for health care, child care, and domestic production will help them to manage.

The Need for A Dalit Curriculum: Recommendations to the Indian Government
    There is a paucity of studies on the influence of caste on learning among Dalits in India; nevertheless there is a considerable body of research on minority or multicultural education in Western societies (Banks 1987; 1988; Gollnick and Chinn 1990; Ramsey, Vold and Williams 1989; Teidt and Teidt 1990), on the cultural bases of education (Giroux 1991; Pai 1990), and on how multicultural education can be used to empower minority students (Sleeter 1991). In general, multicultural educators stress that the school curriculum should reflect the ethnic and cultural diversity within the society and not idealised views of the life and culture within a nation-state. These studies on multiculturalism and ethnic minorities in the West are comparable to the issue of casteism confronting the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in India, and a lot of the concerns in the Western literature are helpful in understanding Dalit educational issues.
    Commenting on the American context, Ogbu (1978) argues that the dominated status of a minority group such as African Americans, exposes them to conditions that predispose children to school failure even before they start going to school, for example in their lack of mainstream language skills and cultural capital. The required changes to reverse this pattern of failure in schools entails not only personal redefinitions of the way teachers interact with the children and the communities they serve, but institutional redefinitions as well, since students from "dominated" societal groups are "empowered" or "disabled" in part through their interactions with teachers and schools.
    To better understand the cultural context of educational institutions, Cummins (1993) outlines four structural elements in the organisation of schooling which contributes to the degree of minority students' empowerment or disempowerment: (i) the incorporation of minority students' culture and language, (ii) inclusion of minority communities in the education of their children, (iii) pedagogical assumptions operating in the classroom, and (iv) the assessment of minority students. While a detailed study of these four issues is beyond the scope of this book, a brief discussion of the first issue on minority students' culture and language provides a context through which the others could be understood.
    A significant amount of research data indicate that the extent to which "dominated" minority students' language and culture are incorporated into the school program serves as an important predictor of academic success among these students (Campos and Keatinge 1984; Cummins 1983; Rosier and Holm 1980). Success in school for students reflect both the academic learning developed through instruction and the reinforcement of their cultural identity (Cummins 1993).
    In addition to research on the multi-cultural dimensions of education mentioned above, studies that have been conducted using anti-discrimination materials, interracial contact, and special units on minority groups, indicate that children's racial prejudices can be modified by school experiences specifically designed for this purpose. For instance, one group of studies (Trager and Yarrow 1952; Johnson 1966; Litcher and Johnson 1969; cited in Banks 1988) found that children exposed to a democratic curriculum expressed more positive racial attitudes, and those exposed to an ethnocentric curriculum developed more negative racial feelings. In seven further studies reported by Stephan (1985, cited in Banks 1988), the use of multiethnic school curricula has resulted in the reduction of prejudice.
    Similar to the situation in US schools, educational institutions in India are Hinduized and Anglicised, meaning they represent the values of caste Hindu and English societies. Education is very much a part of local and national politics (Acharya 1981; 1989) and Indian schools are expected to blend Dalit and other "minority" students into the Hindu mainstream through compulsory education and emphasis on Hindu culture, history and civics. This curriculum ignores the history and practice of casteism, sexism and class domination throughout India.
    In recent times, the victory of the Hindu fundamentalist party, the BJP, in national elections hints that the notion of a secular state is being abandoned at the polls. Although the BJP ruling group includes a few token Dalit women and men, the party openly expresses the desire to establish a Hindu state. This has resulted in all sorts of antagonisms against non-Hindus and conversions from Hinduism, from the distruction of Babri masjid in UP and enforced migration of millions of Muslims from Bombay in 1992, to the recent burnings of Churches, and rapes and killings of Christians and Dalits all over India.
    State governments run by the BJP have already made several changes in school syllabi that reflect the crude communal bias that characterise their Brahminical agenda and Hindutva view of history. In Madhya Pradesh, they re-wrote the entire textbooks from nursery to the post-graduate level with a Hindu emphasis. Efforts are also underway in other states including Rajasthan, UP, and Kanataka, where Christian schools are accused, ironically, of promoting religion in schools. The BJP governments are making further proposals to include sanskrit as "compulsory" from Class three to Class ten, and giving the Vedas and Upanishads their "due place in the curriculum" in all levels of education.
    In December, 1998, the BJP State government in UP set in process the "spiritualising, nationalising and Indianising" of education by instructing all of the primary schools in the state to begin their day with Hindu prayers. Children, regardless of their religious background, have to recite the "Saraswathi Vandana" in the mornings and the Bhojan Mantra before their afternoon meal. Muslim children are often asked to lead the prayers and there are punishments meted out for not praying. Children are made to give the hand extended salute of the Hindu right wing group, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and in some places they have to respond with "Vande Mataram" at the time of the roll call (Frontline 1998a). The RSS was banned following its assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948.
    The RSS-funded organization, Vidya Bharathi, has 30,000 shakhas (branches), 2,500 pracharaks (propagandists) and almost three million volunteers. In 1996, the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) conducted an evaluation of school textbooks, including those prescribed in Vidya Bharati schools in the country. It was reported that there were 6,000 such schools with 1.2 million students on their rolls under the tutelage of 40,000 teachers. The NCERT made the alarming diagnosis that many of the Vidya Bharati textbooks were "designed to promote bigotry and religious fanaticism in the name of inculcating knowledge of culture in the young generation". The evaluation found it a matter of "serious concern" that such material was being utilised for instruction in schools which, "presumably, have been accorded recognition" (Frontline 1998b). The ruling government is attempting to bring the Vidya Bharati and RSS ideology to the centre stage of the national education system.
    But even within the existing national system, Indian historian Thapar notes that barring a few exceptions "history is still generally taught in Indian schools as it was half a century ago” (Frontline 1997). India’s history books and texts are full of historical errors, biases, prejudices, outdated theories and assumptions, and glorified stories of "upper" caste kings and priests, and of the supposed inferiority of the “lower” castes and women. Further, Dalit life histories, knowledge and languages are excluded from the curriculum. There is very limited coverage of other religions and cultures, such as Jainism, Buddhism, and Christianity, in history texts and the curriculum in general. There is widespread support and justification of casteist culture and Hindu epics on the one hand, and condemnation of Dalit and tribal cultures on the other hand, in literary texts, mainstream media and the popular press.
    Moreover, "upper" caste teachers, curriculum and texts are all silent on the issue of caste discrimination, as if it does not exist. The predominant caste Hindu, village school teachers customarily reinforce caste rules which forbid eating with or touching Dalits, and almost never live in or visit the Dalit colony in the village. Dalit students are treated as inferior because of their birth and are not expected to excel in school (Desai and Uchat 1981; Ilaiah 1996; Kamila 1985). The passing rates from these village schools are poor, and the well-off, "upper" caste students often go to better schools or buy their graduation certificates. Even though there has been over four decades of reforms aimed at reversing the pattern of school failure among disadvantaged groups in India, the dropout rate among Dalit females and males remains extremely high, as discussed in chapter three.
    It should be clearly understood that caste empowerment among Dalits is different from casteism. It is the backlash from the "upper" and "forward" castes against the Dalit upsurge that is casteist, not the upsurge itself. Casteism is caste prejudice plus power, so in India, only caste Hindus can perpetuate casteism because of their control over political, economic and social institutions. This does not mean that people from a variety of backgrounds and orientations are incapable of prejudice or exempt from confronting casteism and discrimination on any level.
    In planning the improvement of Indian society and schools, the inclusion of minority cultural features may include strategies like taking into account Dalits' learning styles and patterns of interaction, and the incorporation of different minority languages, folk stories, histories, and arts into the school curriculum. Inclusion of majority communities' cultures, comprised of Dalit, Adivasi (tribal), Sudra ("low" caste Hindu), and women, should furthermore involve a careful rewriting of school curriculum and texts to eliminate all reference to ideologies and justifications which support the unjust, patriarchal Hindu caste system and control by minority "upper" caste Hindus.
    Caste is not only a socio-economic structure of discrimination, but a religiously sanctioned form of apartheid as well. The Indian caste system is integrally connected to Hinduism, and the question of what Hinduism looks like without caste is an important one that needs to be addressed by the State and activists alike. The elimination of all references to Hinduism in the curriculum would go a long way towards eliminating caste aparthied in India, and Dalits and young women should not be compelled to learn curriculum that justify their subordinate gender and caste positions. Likewise, the inclusion of subaltern perspectives on the history and origin of caste, untouchability, and sexism, discussed in chapter six, is necessary to bring about real changes in aparthied India.
    Significantly, the problem of cultural amnesia and remembrance among Dalits likewise needs to addressed by planners and educators alike, in view of the fact that the working of the caste system has always tried to create mental states of self-doubt, self-denial and self-hatred among the "lower" caste individual, and so these attitudes are internalised and collectivised. The pain of being born in humiliated communities often leads to self-hate, and for many upwardly mobile Dalits, to the painful severing of ties with their community and a conscious effort to forget their past.
    There needs to be future research which focus on the cultural aspects of Dalit women's lives, on the relationship between gender and culture, on the influence of Ambedkar and Buddhism among Dalit women, and on determining what a Dalit-centric curriculum would look like. Political pressure likewise need to be applied at all levels to have the various Scheduled Castes and Tribes commissions and agencies formulate and introduce Dalit cultural and curriculum issues into India's public schools.
    Notwithstanding, Dalits are not passively waiting for the Indian state to act. Activists in the Dalit movement are not only refusing to forget their past, but are vigorously engaged in a deliberate effort to remember it through revival of folk culture and Ambedkarism, as new forms of self-respect (Berremen 1979; Nagaraj 1993). The movement by the economically oppressed to set aside numerous, complex, deep rooted divisions and subcaste differences in order to adopt a Dalit identity is itself a form of class or subaltern consciousness.
    Nagaraj (1993) comments on Dalits struggle in Karnataka for cultural rights:
In senses more than one the notion of culture includes realms of religion also in this context. Attempts to seek equal space to affirm the existing religious practices have also led to blood bath and massive violence. Similarly the decision to not participate in a religious and cultural event which has demeaning roles for Dalits can attract violence. For the last two decades or so Dalits are increasingly declining to participate in the village festival where there is no respectable role for them and this has landed them into serious trouble with caste Hindus (1993:36).
This statement suggests that in rejecting religiously demeaning representations, an active construction of cultural roles is occurring among some Dalits on account of exposure to new rights and violent resistance from caste Hindus.
    For instance, Dalits are defining their own cultural space in celebrating Ambedkar's Birthday on April 14th with a huge day-long celebration in Bidar town and all over the state. The spread of Buddhism in the district and state among Dalits is another example of cultural opposition to Hinduism. In several weddings, it was reported that village elders bless the couple without Hindu ceremonies or rituals (Nagaraj 1993; Pinto 1996).
    The continued refusal by the State to recognise the true role and nature of Hinduism and caste in Indian society insinuate that the State itself is casteist and is not really serious about dismantling the unjust caste system, despite the fact that secularism is enshrined in its constitution and law. The continued existence of the caste system functions as a source of humiliation not only for Dalits in India, but for India's standing in public opinion world-wide, and for the South Asian diaspora as well.
    With the increasing caste-class conflict between Dalits and caste Hindus, an authoritarian Hindu state could prove disastrous for the emerging Dalit movement, and women's movement, by wiping out the small gains made since independence. Increasing social conflict give rise to political and economic instability, which hampers growth and development. For India to become a truly modern state, with upward social mobility and raising standard of living for all, the caste system has to be replaced by an equitable, meritocratic system   
    Dalit women and men contribute enormous amount of labour, money and energies to India's national development, yet their efforts are not recognised or valued. Anti-discrimination laws and reservation policies are not being implemented, and it is very difficult for Dalit women to gain access to justice or reserved positions for Dalits or women in employment and education sectors.
    The constitution needs to be implemented; in addition there should be reservations for advantaged, "upper" caste Hindu groups in proportion to their numbers, above which they cannot exceed. And since they are already ahead in terms of education and economic status, "upper" caste Hindus should be given less political power relative to their numbers. This strategy addresses the power issue from the perspective of disempowering dominant groups in addition to empowering dominated groups.
    Dalit women suffer from the interconnections of multiple oppressions of class, caste, and gender at all levels (household, village, district, state, national and global) by both men and women, from all castes and classes. As a consequence, affirmative action programs and policies should be designed specifically to improve the status of rural Dalit women, and such policies and programs need to take into account the specific nature of the interconnections of gender, caste and class oppressions at all levels, along with the need to incorporate Dalit women themselves into decision-making and leadership.

Voices from the Subaltern - Chapter Seven


Voices from the Subaltern
 

Education and Empowerment
Among Rural Dalit (Untouchable) Women

by
Moses Seenarine
Date: 1/31/99; Revised: 2/26/03
 Chapter 7 - Not One Pisa (Cent) : Caste, Class and Development Practices
Introduction

    This chapter focuses on economic issues and presents a review of development practices in light of the findings. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section comprise of discussions on class and class in India, the material position of Dalit women in rural society; women, the state and development; criticism of government programs for rural women; and empowerment, NFE and NGOs.

Caste and Class in India

    In India, caste and class are significant dimensions of social stratification. They are closely interrelated, almost inseparable, basic processes of Dalit social life, in that both (i) structure their life chances, (ii) pattern their social conditions, (iii) influence their cultural expressions, and (iv) provides solidarity in face of external foes, yet are subject to internal conflicts. The assumption made here is that although there are several important exceptions, caste is synonymous with class in India.
    Caste is becoming a political process in which class and power are inherently embedded, and class configuration are building upon rather than destroying primary caste identities (Sharma 1994). Caste is rapidly finding a place for itself in non-conventional and secular domains of social, political and economic life. Any group that aspires to use caste for upward social mobility makes use of the 'caste idiom'. Economically and politically dominant groups likewise make use of caste for further upward social and cultural mobility. Caste is appropriated for economic and political goals in the first instance, and for socio-cultural mobility in the second (Kothari 1991).
    As a further illustration of this process, although caste Hindus command most of the wealth and high incomes in the country and correspondingly dominate in culture, religious, and political spheres, there is a process of revivalism and sanskritisation occurring among the "upper" and "lower" castes respectively (Gangadharan 1970; Pandey 1990; 1991). As a result, the "middle" castes (OBCs), through sanskritisation and upward social mobility, have become a political force to reckon with and are now trying to challenge or compete with the near monopoly of the upper castes and break their control over the higher positions in the professions, bureaucracy and higher educational institutions (Kothari 1991).
    At the same time, the prevalence of class issues such as intergenerational poverty and bonded labour among Dalits, illustrate that these issues are intimately connected to their caste status in the Hindu social order. By virtue of being born into the "out" castes, practically all Dalits find it difficult to move out of their lower class position. Some mobility is possible, for example, through access to education and employment, nonetheless for the vast majority, the linkage is tight.
    Some of the writings on Dalits demonstrate that there has been a relatively small upward movement of their economic and social status since India's independence, and as a consequence, caste-class conflict between Dalits and caste Hindus is escalating. Scholars (Ilaiah 1996; Pinto 1996) point out that there is an inherent conflict between civil society formed by the consolidation of both ideological and structural forces of the caste Hindu system, and Dalit society which is no longer abiding by the old ideological and structural rules. Dalits are resisting Hindu domination, especially on account of the increasing prominence placed on Ambedkar's life and writings.
    In like fashion, research on Indian women show that there have been modest improvements in the status of poor, rural females over the last 50 years, in tandem with the expanding influence of the Indian women's movement, though with the contemporary upsurge of Hindu fundamentalism, women's status is increasingly being negatively influenced. Nonetheless, due to increased privatisation, structural adjustment policies, and the decrease in provision of welfare services, Dalit women are affected by the feminization of poverty, labour, and nonliteracy. These issues serve to dampen claims of increased socio-economic mobility among Dalits by pointing out that Dalit women have unequal access to opportunities for education and employment, and therefore for increased mobility.
    Researchers also suggest that the constitutional guarantee of protection for scheduled caste groups has not substantially improved their position in Hindu society (Gallanter 1961; 1963; 1969; 1984). Only about 11 percent of Dalits live in urban areas; most live in rural areas and are employed as landless agricultural laborers or marginal farmers (Dunn 1993). With the increasing privatisation and modernisation of the economy, caste and class interconnections are being reinforced for Dalits (Johri and Krishnakumar 1991), as one researcher notes:
The Mangs, the Chamars, the Dhors have not altogether left their traditional occupations. The traditional tasks of these castes are becoming increasingly irrelevant in modern life. It has resulted in making them poorer... the Mangs (who do basket and rope-making) have become nearly jobless in the villages. Prostitution is on the increase among them because of increasing poverty. It was shocking to learn that sometimes encouragement for prostitution came from the elders in the family itself (Kakade 1990:142).
    Dalit women's responses to multiple oppressions of gender, caste and class, varied from co-operation to overt resistance, with the majority of respondents' actions occurring somewhere in between. The most striking finding is that although Dalit patriarchy is a significant influence on the lives of all respondents, the caste/class system, and Dalits' location within it, serves as the most critical and decisive factor in respondents' lives, more important than gender issues. The persistence of rural Dalit women's powerlessness and poverty may be viewed as a manifestation of the unequal distribution of power and resources in their society, which is more highly stratified by caste and class, than by gender.
    Dalit females' caste/class status in part determines their gender status, and is also difficult to change. To cite an example, while the majority of respondents had an opportunity to attend the village primary school, the cost of bus fare became more weighty than gender issues for the few who were allowed to temporarily attend high school outside the village. With regards to schooling, Lieten agrees with this finding as he observes, "junior school-going is much less discriminated by gender than by the economic position" (1992:108).
    This issues reveals how Dalit young women’s caste/class position is more important than their gender status in determining access to education. As another example, class issues largely determine gender issues such as child marriages among Dalit females, who depend on elder brothers to pay for their marriage expenses before leaving the home.
    In the case of Bangladeshi women under the purdah system, Hashemi and Schuler claim that the most significant transformation in a woman's life, is her changing `sense of self worth.' The authors suggests that a woman's self-confidence is directly related to her perception of the future, for example, hoping for a better future for herself and her children (including their daughters), planning ahead, and so forth. Concerning women's collective action or `participation in non-family groups,' they argue that very rarely women's groups may achieve the solidarity, confidence and strength to oppose social injustices (1993).
    The self-worth of Dalit women are intricately linked to their caste status, and so must be addressed along with their gender status. However, these issues are insufficiently explored in the literature, and there is a need for further research comparing the relative significance of caste and gender issues with respect to Dalit women.

The Material Position of Dalit Women in Rural Society
    "Upper" caste/class ideologies and domination is intimately linked to gender persecution as well. The vast majority of Dalit women are manual workers in urban and rural areas who live at or beneath a minimal subsistence level (Pawde 1995). These women strive not for gender equality, but for their very survival (Mukhopadhyay 1984). Despite the abundance of problems, there are few studies which focus specifically on rural Dalit women (Kavita et al. 1988), or on Dalit female agricultural workers (Reddy 1984).
    Bhagwat argues that phrases like “marginalization of women in the development process”, “feminization of poverty”, or “women's contribution in the unorganized sector”, all refer to Dalit women without even being conscious about their specificity (1995:2). About 90 percent of women working in the unorganized agricultural sector are mainly from the "lower" castes. With the increasing stress on female labor in agriculture and agro-based industries, the burden on Dalit women in rural areas have intensified over the years.     In addition, the number of women headed households has been on the increase and there has been a growing deterioration and privatization of the country's common property resources on which the poor in general and women in particular depend (Agarwal 1986; 1988). Since only five to ten percent of Dalit women live a middle class life, there is not a lot of difference between their pre-independence and post-independence conditions (Pawde 1995).
    As an example of their poverty, during the first half of the 20th century, Dalit women agricultural laborers were so impoverished that they used to collect the undigested corn from the excreta of bullocks and prepare a bread out of it called `gobarha' (Shankar 1993). More recently, Sharma (1995) reports that among the Bhangis, scavenging is done mainly by the female scavenger, and so is the cleaning of latrines. Young Dalit women are often hired out as bonded laborers to rich farmers, where they are often raped and sexually abused (Mishkaben 1996).
    The life of Dalit women in rural areas is full of hardships as they have to deal with the adversities of the caste system much more than urban Dalit women, such as the practice of untouchability, casteism, non-literacy, socio-cultural variation, religious exploitation and superstitions, and class variation in society (Prabhavathi 1995). They have to tolerate the injustice and torture of the "higher" caste landowners when they go out to work in their fields. Due to extreme poverty women have to collect fuel for cooking and while doing so listen to the curses and abuses of "higher" class Hindus (Pawde 1995; Punalekar 1995).
    The basic problem that affects the Dalit woman's role and opportunities for employment is the rural areas spring from their helpless dependence on caste Hindu landowners, caused by their own landlessness, paucity of adequate employment opportunities, limited skills, non-literacy, restricted mobility and lack of autonomous status. The absence of control over productive resources and a persistent gap between consumption and expenditure leading to perpetual indebtedness, deprive Dalit women of all bargaining power and occupational mobility (Prabhavathi 1995).
    A Dalit woman is financially deprived and compelled to work at less wages than men doing the same work. They are never permanently appointed and no protection to their wages is rendered (Pawde 1995). In this study, a sixteen year old respondent attests that Dalit women agricultural labourers have to beg "high" caste landowners for their salaries. And an eighteen year respondent state, "we used to borrow money and the ‘higher’ castes used to charge us more and more interest”.
    Food allocation in the family is heavily biased in favor of men, in spite of the fact that Dalit women in many regions perform at least fifteen hours of arduous labor. They have to face the problem of hunger almost daily and the combination of gender and caste/class discrimination contributes to a greater mortality rate among them. For example, early marriage, child rearing, and their hard work in the fields, make them more undernourished, ill and unhygienic. Moreover, they cannot purchase medicines for themselves and for their children (Rege 1995).
    Through there are some hopeful signs of upward improvements in health, housing and education of Dalit communities, such instances are comparatively few. State sponsored developmental activities like the Integrated Rural Development Programme, have played a useful role in poverty alleviation, relieving misery and have certainly brought some awareness to Dalit women in the rural areas (Aranha, Fernando and Mahale 1991; Punalekar 1995).
    Dalit women bear the costs of "development" but have been systematically excluded from its 'benefits'. If anything they have been viewed as "target groups", the recipients of "development" programs, planned and implemented by groups with economic and political power. For the first thirty years after independence, women figured in the planned development as only 'mothers' in the 'mother and child welfare programs'; despite the fact that more than 50 percent of all agricultural labor was provided by women (GOI 1974; Rege 1995).
    The lion's share of development benefits for poor and low income people are awarded to men. For example, in the employment assistance scheme provided by the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), from 1984-1989, the number of female beneficiaries is less than half that of male beneficiaries. Under the Trysem program for providing income generating skills, from 1984 to 1989, there was only one female for every 17 male beneficiaries (UNICEF 1989). Simultaneously state projects have led to overburdening and self-exploitation by Dalit women (Jogdand 1995; Punalekar 1995) and there has been no major breakthrough in women's development which touches the problems at its roots (Aranha, Fernando and Mahale 1991).
    Rural Dalit women are compelled to become economically dependent on the state, community, and family. Faced with survival needs, they are forced into fending for themselves, but being on one’s own is not necessarily empowering. Perhaps these women have little to gain from so-called empowerment programs which provide training and not access to jobs, grants, land and other economic resources.
    Furthermore, because of fierce competition for scarce resources like firewood and fodder, Dalit women have to struggle harder to secure basic necessities of life. Another point which needs serious attention is that of availability of water. Dalit women suffer more because of caste distinctions and less or remote access to village water resources. Water scarcity situation can adversely affect the education of young women because if they have to spend time looking for water, they cannot go to school (Punalekar 1995).
    Development for Dalit women has resulted in them being herded into crowded and unhealthy areas in Dalit sections of villages or in slums, with very few civic amenities and with limited access to conveniences and 'benefits' which are theirs as basic rights. To them 'development' has meant displacement from their traditional productive activity and their labor and sexuality have been abused and exploited in the capitalist market-place (Gnanadason 1990). The process of rural development has played a decisive role in forced migration of Dalit women from rural to urban areas.
    The majority of Dalit women work under extremely exploitative situations such as starvation wages, violence, rape, sexual exploitation, and religiously sanctioned sex-work. Akatai Kamble, a Dalit Mahar woman who worked full time in the tobacco industry, explain their situation:
The women supervisors in the factory would give us a lot of trouble. The manager and the owner were even worse. If they saw any good-looking woman they would call her to sweep the owner's office and rape her. At that time we could not protest because if we said anything they would remove us from work. So no woman would say anything. She preferred to keep quiet. Even I was very scared because if I lost that work how would I feed my children? Since there was no one to support us we continued to live in fear. All the women were in the same condition of poverty and the majority were Mahars. Casteism was so strong that Mahar women were not allowed to touch the keys or even the water utensils. When we asked for water it was given to us from a distance.
For the next ten years I worked like an animal. Even animals are given rest in the evening after a day's work. But we didn't get even that. I worked til one or two o'clock in the morning. Then I would sleep a few hours and wake up to cook, bathe and go back to work by eight o'clock. So I worked for almost twenty-four hours. Whenever I fell ill the children would suffer and we never money to buy medicines. But I didn't go to anyone when my children were starving. After my mother's death I worked alone and supported the three of them. Gradually I stopped being afraid and became courageous (Kamble 1986:20).
    Similar to Dalit women, Bhil tribal women describe their degrading experience of sex-work, which is considered `routine' with male labor foremen, contractors, and government development workers, in order to feed themselves and their families. Poverty leaves few options (Mishkaben 1996). There is a collusion and competition between male caste Hindu contractors, Patels (landowners), and Bhil labor foremen, mukadams, to obtain the sexual favors of tribal women. There is also a collusion between Bhil men and women to sexually exploit the `extra' attractiveness of young tribal females, leading to the rape and death of uncooperative young girls. Yet, the Bhil women also proved that they will physically fight their own Bhil men, outside contractors and paid bullies, to protect `outside' female social workers from beatings and rape (Mishkaben 1996).
    Paradoxically, Dalit women’s meager earnings from manual labor do lead to forms of independence for some, as Mencher (1988) suggests, Dalit and "lower" caste women are generally independent earners who are, to some degree, economically independent of their husbands (1988). Moreover, in non-Brahmin cultures, women are valued both as producers of children and for their role as active participants in agriculture labor (Kapadia 1994).
Women, The State and Development
    Generally, women have been either ignored or only included in development processes as "add ons" rather than as integral parts of a planning and policy making process. Although there is a variety of feminist perspectives, most would agree that gender represents a worldwide point of inequality. McCarthy writes,
a gendered construction of women's roles in development activity assumes the limited, inferior nature of women and involves the creation of parameters of movement participation for females which mobilize their resources and creative energy without threatening established forms of patriarchal domination and control (1993:323﷓324).
    Many feminists have made a distinction between women's "practical" and "strategic" gender needs (Molyneux 1985; Moser 1989). Young (1988) made a similar distinction between the material "condition" in which women live, that is, menial wages, poor nutrition, lack of access to health care, and education, and the "position" or social and economic status of women as compared to men. Policies for meeting women's practical gender needs have to focus on the domestic arena, on income earning activities, and also on community-level requirements of housing and basic services.
    To attain women's strategic interests, Molyneux argues that organizing and mobilizing women is essential which requires:
analysis of women's subordination and... the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist... such as the abolition of the sexual division of labor, the alleviation of the burden of domestic labor and child care, the removal of institutionalized forms of discrimination, the establishment of political equality, freedom of choice over childbearing and... measures against male violence and control over women (1985).
However, practical gender needs are closely related to strategic gender needs and may often not be separated as such in rural women's thinking.
    Gender planning should address women's immediate problems (food, water, childcare, etc.) and institutional inequalities; to illustrate, providing women with employment which challenge the gender based division of labor. Young (1993) points out that practical gender needs and interests can transform themselves into strategic concerns; to cite an instance, women themselves can form a locally-based women's cooperative, which then has the potential to undermine or transform gender and economic relations (Young 1993).
Criticism of Government Programs for Rural Women
    Indira Gandhi's family planning program in the 1970s created a serious crisis in the legitimacy of the government at the grassroots level. The declaration of emergency and withdrawal of civil rights in 1975 led to many atrocities, and Dalit women were made the special targets of population control programs in a bid to limit their family size and so provide them an 'opportunity for development.' Horror stories have been related by Dalit women of how they and their sisters have been butchered in 'family planning camps,' often without their knowledge of what is being done to them.
    Currently, the state’s family planning agenda is still being implemented and injectable contraceptives and other hormone drugs are being tested on these powerless, voiceless women by unscrupulous multi-national business (Gnanadason 1990). Although MSK do not overtly promote family planning, neither are the health problems associated with contraceptives discussed with rural Dalit women, the main targets of these programs.
    Since the crisis of the 1970s, the state has gained significant ground in its bid to gain acceptance for its existing development policies through funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), literacy and so on, based on various women in development (WID) approaches (Sakhare 1992; Sharma 1992; Sims 1991; Viswanath 1993). "The main objective of all these programmes/schemes is to bring women into the mainstream of national development" (Goela 1992). It is generally thought that local NGOs may be more sensitive to local communities' needs, and better able than state institutions to respond organizationally to the practical and strategic needs of local women (Pimpalapure 1992; Sen 1986; SEWA 1984; Stromquist 1986).
    Nonetheless, there are serious debates over NGOs including the role NGOs play "as the new frontier of corporate capitalism”, (Kothari 1986) government and foreign funding of voluntary activity, the regulation of NGOs, the role of activists, and so on (Dhanagare 1989; Garain 1993; Qureshi 1988; Sen 1986). Programs run by NGOs also encounter problems similar to those operated by the government, including hierarchical structures, autocratic management, bureaucratic procedures, and corruption (Baxamusa 1994; D'Abreo 1992; PRIA 1991; Singh and Singh 1992). Participant observation and interviews with key informants reveal that these problems are all present within the MSK program.
    There is little evidence to suggest that, when undertaken on a larger scale, NGO programs are consistently more effective than government programs. As one editor points out, in the name of `voluntarism' what many voluntary agencies are doing is "only an extension of their private market efforts, with substantial benefits to themselves" (Lokayan 1986b). Participant observation and discussions with other NGOs suggest that AIKYA operates as a business rather than as a non-profit, voluntary organization.
    Indian feminists have raised several questions about government-sponsored WID programs surrounding issues of women's participation and organization. For example, in contrast to development plans for other sections of the population which emphasizes policy measures, resource allocation or redefining development, why is the government viewing women's development in terms of developing consciousness, organization, income generation skills, and so on, as opposed to more tangible development outcomes (Goyal 1988; Jain et al. 1988; Rath and Rath 1990; Savara 1990)? Coached in the language of “strategic gender needs” these policies all have hidden family planning agendas.
    Apart from government WID programs, increasing numbers of women's grassroots activities and voluntary organizations are becoming part of India women's movement (Anveshi 1993; EPW 1993; Gandhi and Shah 1991; Lokayan 1986; Manimala 1983; Mies 1983; Sathe 1990; Vimochana 1994; Yasas and Metha 1990). Given the growing nature of women's grassroots activism, will a government takeover of women's organizing potential, by absorbing them into government-sponsored organizations like Mahila Samakhya, act as a way to subvert any future attempts at organizing women? Will incorporation of women activists into administration and implementation of government-run programs serve to co-opt the independent women's movement? Are these organizations like a management/owner sponsored trade union of workers? These are all relevant questions in regards to MSK, however these issues are beyond the scope of this study.
    Many rural women's programs operated by the government and donors, like the Women's Development Program (WDP) in Rajasthan, have a family planning agenda, sometimes overt, but mostly hidden (Balasubrahmanyan 1988; Jain et al. 1988). Programs to conscientize, mobilize, and build up the confidence of women are considered necessary in order to help women to overcome some of the  constraints of feudal and patriarchal structures and accept the government's population program and other schemes (EPW 1992). Singh, Dey and Roy writes:
The government has only succeeded in presenting a progressive facade because of the involvement of NGOs and individuals with credibility.... Women had learnt the jargon of change and participated in various follow up programmes... where radical goals and processes were re-emphasised. Her alienation from the village had begun when she received the Rs 200 stipend from the government. She was told by others in the village that after all the government was paying her to do a job... (She) opposed a child marriage in her village, although the act made her alienation complete (1994:1377)
The WDP program points out the fact that empowered women often become victims of powerful gender, caste and class interests, and are left to fend for themselves by the development programs which initially sponsors them. This is exactly what happened when the young Dalit woman involved with MSK was raped, as discussed in the last chapter.
    Given the acute practical gender needs of poor rural women, WID programs which provide economic, social, and political resources, run the risk of becoming so popular that administrators may soon face the tasks of "cooling women off" before women's participation becomes a threat to the status quo. There is some evidence to suggest that this was the case with MSK a few years after it was established, where de-mobilizing women became a high priority at the State and district levels.
    This was largely accomplished by discouraging women's participation in the program, trying to restrict women's activities which are independent of the program, employing dysfunctional administrators, creating obstacles for local NGOs and staff, employing male personnel, etc. The aftermaths of this process ranged from despair and apathy among program participants and high turn-over rates among district administrators, to mis-appropration of funds and sexual exploitation of Dalit female program participants by caste “Hindu” male employees of the program.
    Another problem is that WID activists and staff often do not understand the complex nature of power, patriarchy, the social construction of gender, and the ways in which family, class, caste, religion and other factors perpetuate women's subordination. Neither do they understand clearly how women's subordination can be solved through the concepts and processes of empowerment. Aprt from MSK’s first state director, there were no other women in program who had a firm grasp on feminist issues, and ironically, local feminists who applied were not hired.
    It is important that space be made for women to discuss and share experiences, to build a collective identity and examine the root causes of their poverty and subordination, and women's informal associations like the village Sangha may provide such space (March and Taqqu 1986). However, this process is unpredictable. Women who are different and sometimes in competition and conflict with each other may find it very difficult to assume gender commonalties when brought together as not all low income rural women have the same needs and interests (Millican 1992). There should be recognition of diversity at the same time as there are efforts to enhance women's self-worth, agency and common purpose. These issues are clearly illustrated in the rivalry among Dalit sub-castes involved with MSK, discussed in the last chapter.
    Although women form a majority of applicants in government programs for employment generation, and so on, Raj (1986) argues that most programs "do not take any note of the special needs of women either in conception, design, implementation or hiring of personnel" (:72). Open and democratic processes are essential in empowering women to withstand the social and family pressures that result from their participation in programs. Shared responsibility and decision-making are also necessary processes for the individual and collective empowerment of women. The Mahila Samakhya program failure in this regard is discussed in the last chapter.
    Kimmelstrand (1989) diagrams a scale of empowerment, from low to high, with five criterias in ascending order: welfare, access, conscientization, participation, and control. The MSK program is conceptualized at the access or participation level, with the emphasis placed on Sangha savings and entrepreneurial self-reliance. Since Dalit women are presumed to empower themselves in the Sanghas there is less need for program support and there is no mention of the need to alter existing social structures or for those with power to change themselves (Young 1993).
    Often literacy, NFE and a combination of reproductive, productive and emancipatory skills are viewed as having the potential to contribute to the process of women's empowerment. Nevertheless, studies indicate there are or can be negative outcomes from women's participation in NFE programs and it is important to find out what the women themselves consider attainable (Ellsworth 1992; Helleman 1992; Kindervatter 1979; Lind and Johnson 1990; Pigozzi 1982; van der Westen 1993). The MSK program fails to address the discrepancy between younger and older respondents’ aspirations for literacy, as discussed in the previous chapters.
    Everett points out, "although `conscientisation' or consciousness-raising is an important activity in grassroots movements, it seems incorrect to assume that the oppressed lack an understanding of their problems" (1986:18-19). Kabeer (1994; 1995) similarily argues that the space given by an NGO to the establishment of needs from the bottom-up, reveal a great deal about how it has positioned women within its programmatic undertaking, either as capable, but socially confined actors who are potentially able to make choices, articulate priorities and take responsibility, or as passive clients in need of enlightenment and uplifting.
    The findings in chapters four, five and six reveal that Dalit women are aware of their problems, however they are viewed as passive participants in need of enlightenment by the MSK program. Other studies likewise reveal that the poor (Sharma 1989) and women are conscious of their problems (Bhanti 1994; Kelkar and Mahlans 1982).
    Similar to Christian fundamentalism and the anti-abortion movement in the US, Hindu fundamentalism may represent a form of backlash against the feminist movement in India. Given the rapid feminization of labour in the economy, there is strong resistance against raising gender issues in many movements based on class, caste, ethnicity, culture, religion, and minority issues; movements which are largely led by men. Women's groups in India will have to find ways of building networks with Dalit, tribal and environment movements who are their natural allies in a struggle against Hindu patriarchy and related class and cultural domination (Dietrich 1992). The focus on gender and patriarchy by MSK isolates Dalit women from other groups who share common problems with the dominant Hindu social order.
    For instance, poor men are almost as powerless as poor Dalit women in terms of access to and control over material, cultural and ideological resources. The empowerment of Dalit women, therefore, does not necessarily lead to disempowerment of poor men. Instead, Dalit women's empowerment may also liberate and empower men, both in material and psychological terms. For example, Batliwala writes:
most poor men tend to support women's empowerment processes that enable women to bring much-needed resources into their families and communities, or that challenge power structures that have oppressed and exploited the poor of both genders (1994:130).
    Male resistance, however, occurs when women complete with men for power in the private or public spheres, for example, when they question the power, rights, and privileges of men within the family, that is, whenever women challenge patriarchal family relations. Clearly, in regards to marriage, housework, childcare, physical abuse, and divorce, women's empowerment in the domestic sphere entails a loss of the privileged position which patriarchal ideology defines for men. Yet, when women become equal partners, men are freed from the roles of oppressor and exploiter, and from gender stereotyping, which limits the potential for self-expression and personal development in men as much as in women (Batliwala 1994).
    Despite the opportunities for building alliances with Dalit men, as well as to tribal, Muslim and groups, MSK program functionaries do not address or articulate these issues to respondents’ husbands and fathers, or to other men and groups. Nonetheless, rural Dalit women are themselves building alliances with Dalit men, as evidenced in the cases of rape and accusation of murder discussed in the previous chapter.
    Dalit women, if elected as leaders of both Dalit and feminist groups, can serve as a bridge between the two movements, which would establish them as powerful forces to contend with. Still and all, it may be unreasonable to expect that upper caste women will willingly exchange class and caste status to struggle for some future form of gender empowerment, or that Dalit men would voluntarily trade gender status to engage in gender, caste and class struggle, under Dalit female leadership. The point is that privilege is rarely given up voluntarily and without a fight, and this affiliation between the women and anti-caste movements will require leaders and members of both groups to give up short term advantages for long term equality.

Class Status of Dalit Women and MSK Economic Development Programs

    There has been very limited changes in all of the respondents' economic options as a result of employment and involvement in MSK. The majority of them are poor, landless, and as a matter of course meet with poverty, lack of water, child labour, early marriage, school dropout, and nonliteracy. Those who own land have marginal, arid holdings, and all but a few were unable to complete primary school before joining MSK. A quarter of the respondents, young and old, had never even been to a school.
    Even for those with a primary or high school diploma, employment opportunities inside and outside of the MSK program is severely limited, and therefore practically all of them are forced to work as coolie or day-to-day labourers in the fields for less than minimum wage. After becoming involved in MSK program activities, none of the respondents or their families purchased or sharecropped additional land, brought livestock, or borrowed money from the Sangha's savings account.
    The study’s findings on educational standing show a modest increase in respondents' prior education level compared to their parents, and suggest that there is some upward inter-generational mobility occurring among Dalit women. However, as discussed earlier, respondents’ empowerment and mobility experiences may not be indicative of the experiences of most rural Dalit women. Nevertheless, in view of the multiple oppressions rural Dalit women face, the fact that they are able to survive and pursue their education is most remarkable.
    An implicit assumption of some women's development programs is that by placing emphasis on awareness training and improving poor women's and girls' self-esteem, women will be able to improve their own economic status. Nonetheless, in spite of the huge amount of money spent by MSK on training Dalit women in Bidar, overall, there has been limited change, if any, as a result of awareness training among nearly all respondents in terms of their current economic status.
    As an example of limited economic benefits from MSK, many of the older women's Sanghas started savings accounts with a few thousand rupees in local banks. These small savings accounts that the women collect and manage for themselves are not enough for them to increase their individual or collective economic resources. For instance, there is only enough savings for one loan per year to one woman to purchase a few livestock as an investment. At this rate it would take an entire generation for all the women in one village Sangha to be given the opportunity to borrow a loan to buy one cow. Nonetheless, the total savings of Sanghas in the district was around Rs. 200,000 (US$ 6,500) in mid-1995, and if combined, it could served as an substantial economic resource for the women. The women's savings program is also significant because it is difficult for men to gain access to it.
    In opposition to the potential for creating economic resources for the women through their meager savings, the program encourages the women to spend their hard earned Sangha savings, along with scarce funding from MSK, to buy construction materials in order to build a Sangha hut. Poor, rural women are forced to spend the little money they have, as a result of their participation in the MSK program, on a program related project which they had no input in designing.
    The fact is that these poor women are compelled to contribute a large sum of money to the formal economy with little decision-making power regarding whether they could spend it on food, housing, education, or marriage which generates important social capital for them. At the end of Sangha process, women may have a place for childcare and meetings, but they still have to find the time and energy to manage both, in addition to the double burden in their lives.
    Additionally, a lot of program funds and women's money is being wasted on inappropriate economic development training which accrue social, material and other benefits for trainers and the training agency involved, but not for the poor women. This money could have been better spent supporting women's existing economic activities, like farming, rearing animals, sewing, and construction, or even added to their Sangha savings. The program's explicit goal is to spend its budget on supporting poor women's activities, yet its implementation does not translate into increased income for anyone besides a few Sahayoginis, who are overwhelmingly non-Dalit.
    One example of an unsuitable economic training program is the month-long seri-culture training held by AIKYA for a few Dalit women who owned land. The women were taught how to grow and harvest silk worms, and after the training, were motivated to purchase expensive machinery required for keeping the worms at certain temperatures. A year later, practically all of these women's seri-culture businesses failed because there is not enough water to grow the silk worm plant food, which requires a lot of irrigation. The women have spent and lost their families' precious savings on high-priced machinery which, in addition needs electricity to work, with absolutely no earnings or refund from MSK or AIKYA.
    Mahila Samakhya staff are further encouraging women participants to find out information about loans, to apply to banks for loans, and to use the Sangha savings to start micro enterprises and small scale businesses, such as seri-culture and producing and selling dairy and eggs. Still and all, a major limitation of the program is the failure of program planners to recognise the caste/class issues Dalit women go up against in these enterprises, such as casteism and caste Hindu boycott of Dalit businesses. In the villages in which they live, Dalits face tremendous difficulties in any trade or occupation due to "untouchability”. Moreover, Dalits are discriminated against by banks and government schemes in terms of loans and credit, yet the program does not take this fact into account.
    As an example of how their caste status influences their economic position, Dalit women are forbidden to enter caste Hindu houses or touch their foods, so this limits their employment as domestic workers and cooks, as well as any businesses they may start in catering and proving food and services to caste Hindu households. Since few Hindus will deal with them, there are few ways of earning a living open to "Untouchables”, besides the "polluting" occupations of field labour, sanitation and construction workers. Dalit businesses which compete with dominant Hindu castes' interests are moreover targeted for attack, as numerous newspaper reports reveal nation-wide. These circumstances may prove disastrous for women's micro enterprise and need to be looked at  more thoroughly.

Contradictions in the Empowerment Process
    This study shows there are numerous dilemmas in providing education at the grassroots level, and several contradictions in the process of empowerment occurring among rural Dalit women as well. For example, Dalit women are dependent on the patriarchal State to create a space to enable them to challenge Dalit male dominance in the family and larger society.
    This dependence on the State for gender empowerment complicates the situation for Dalit women's associations like the Sangha, Women's Federation, and MSK, because these associations are also challenging the State and state-mediated forms of patriarchy at the same time. Further, Dalit women may use the State for their own empowerment, yet at the same time find themselves struggling against the State's policies of privatisation and globalisation.
    There is a similar situation in the case of caste empowerment. For various reasons Dalit women are finding it necessary to organise separately from Dalit men because the Dalit movement is male dominated and leaders try to subordinate and suppress the independent political expression of Dalit women. Dalit women are also becoming critical of Dalit men for dominating the literary scene and not taking the work of Dalit women seriously enough. This operates down to the family level in the education of sons over daughters, the double shift of wage work and housework for women, and so on. In terms of class status, not all Dalit women are equally educated or employed, so at some level this creates another type of exclusion as well, for example in leadership positions in the Sangha and Women's Federation, or through employment with MSK.
    While aspects of MSK's nonformal education (NFE) and Sangha formation are promising elements for gender empowerment, they are problematic as well. As a consequence of their participation in MSK, gender and caste empowerment is taking place among all but a few women, by way of illustration, in learning to write their names, count money, read information signs, delaying marriage, changes in sense of self, and in exploring new careers. Regardless, there are other factors which serve to limit women's economic options; for instance, fathers and in-laws may place restraints on work choice, and there are limited employment options due to high levels of unemployment and institutionalised caste discrimination.
    There are gender and caste restrictions placed on Dalit women’s assertiveness as well. If the women demand more wages from employers, they may be punished by family members and their own Dalit community who fear repercussions from caste Hindu landowners. Despite the fact that Dalit women may think and act differently, which may even impact on gender relations, the linkage of caste and class, and domination of males, continue. Regardless of personal, gender and caste empowerment, nearly all of the respondents are forced to remain dependent on field labour for employment at sub-minimum wages.
    "Empowered" respondents furthermore faced backlash from caste Hindus. Empowerment programs must accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions and should provide program participants with some measure of protection from the violent repercussions of Dalit men and dominant  caste Hindu communities, such as incidents of rape, witchcraft, and physical abuse reported by respondents. This points out that empowerment is not just about Dalit women acquiring increased status and skills, but also about those holding power and privilege relinquishing them.
    Empowerment approaches must therefore find ways to force those who wield financial and political power to accept the responsibility to change themselves. Both women and men, Dalit and caste Hindu, poor and rich, have to be transformed for mutual empowerment to last. Education and outside support could serve as important strategies in this process. Organisations like the village Sangha and the Women's Federation could prove crucial to supporting women's struggles for living wages and equal treatment, however these local groups ought to be fully supported through direct funding and linkages with other groups and NGOs at the local, regional and national levels.
Dalit Women's Resistance and Empowerment
    The most striking finding is the active resistance among Dalit respondents, young and old. Far from being passive, backward and ignorant, the data clearly reveals that Dalit women are willing to take action in pursuit of caste, class, and gender interest without the direction or leadership of MSK program staff. In confronting village landlords to pay agreed upon wages, caste Hindu discrimination in obtaining water, village elite in rural land struggles, rape by caste Hindu males, domestic violence, and gender discrimination in education, Dalit women are engaging in individual and collective forms of resistance and empowerment independent of the formal program hierarchy.
    This finding is similar to that of Florence McCarthy, who writes:
Organisations are, at best, catalysts to a vast reservoir of rarely expressed knowledge and awareness held by women regarding their own conditions... women's consciousness of their situation is profound, and informs their responses to structured domains of power and oppressive forms of subordination. It is the structure of the conditions of their lives that sets parameters to the forms of resistance women undertake. When situations arise in which new opportunities occur for bonding with other women, or developing countervailing social relations, women respond, and it is often these aspects of programme activity which in the long run are most important to them (1993:349).
By virtue of their participation in the program, the women are changed and empowered in a way they were not before, as the three case studies make plain. To further illustrate, the women are organising by themselves in preparation for when MSK leaves, as one leader makes clear: "my vision is to continue the Women's Federation as we have only one year to be in Mahila Samakhya”.
    Another woman explains:
Before we had our own family responsibilities. Now we have the responsibility of all the women in the villages. We are doing the Women's Federation. We are not depending on MSK. We don't know when it will stop, so the Federation gives us unity. We don't want it to stop, we want it to continue. In some of the villages there are no Sahayoginis, so we are going there and we are starting Sanghas and we are developing the women.
Similar to McCarthy's findings, the data reveal that rural Dalit women are aware of their situation vis-à-vis the triple oppressions they experience in the local context and the projected ending of the MSK program. They are actively responding to both situations by educating themselves and others, and working together on common issues though their own organisation.

Voices from the Subaltern - Chapter Six


Voices from the Subaltern
 

Education and Empowerment
Among Rural Dalit (Untouchable) Women

by
Moses Seenarine
Date: 1/31/99; Revised: 2/26/03
Chapter 6 - Jai Bhim (Long Live Ambedkar): Change in Caste Identity and New Social Options Among Dalit Women
Introduction

    While rural Dalit women, by virtue of their gender, meet with many hardships in their homes, such as child marriage, patriarchy, domestic production and reproduction, they confront still more difficulties outside the home by virtue of their caste, including institutionalised discrimination in education and employment, access to services, loans, and so on. Indeed, Dalit females' gender persecutions are amplified by their caste and class status. In order to discern the class and caste status of rural Dalit women, it is helpful to understand some aspects of Dalit economic, social, political, and cultural organisation.
    Most of the research on caste in South Asia is written by non-Dalits, with a bias towards supporting existing constructions of caste in the region. While acknowledging the importance of some of these mainstream studies, the brief review focuses on subaltern studies written by Dalits themselves regarding issues of caste, class and gender. These subaltern voices reveal a long history of caste oppression and resistance in South Asia, which continues into the present.
    This chapter focuses on Dalits' points of view regarding their history and caste, untouchability and gender issues. In this sense, the chapter overturns received knowledge on how Dalits are perceived, but more importantly it helps to explain the historical and social dimensions of Dalit female oppression, as well as the cultural basis for their own caste empowerment occurring among respondents outside the scope of the MSK program.
    The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, the history of caste is explored through presentations of nine topics: (i) “Hindu” cultural domination: Dalits and caste apartheid, (ii) the origin of caste in South Asia; (iii) the caste system in global perspective, (iv) the origin of untouchability, (v) caste, class and education, (vi) the caste status of rural Dalits, (vii) Dalits and the struggle for self-identity, (viii) Ambedkar and the Dalit movement, and finally (ix) ending casteism.
    The second section explores the interconnections of caste and gender issues via discussions of four subjects (i) the caste system and gender, (ii) the position of Dalit women in rural society, (iii) caste and Dalit cultures, and (iv) women in Dalit cultures. This is followed by a presentation of the findings of this study in four areas: (i) the caste status of respondents, (ii) caste and learning, (iii) changes in caste status among Dalit women, and finally (iv) a short case study of one Dalit woman's caste empowerment.
    After thousands of years of caste injustices, caste empowerment is more important for rural Dalit women than gender empowerment, even though both are necessary. This chapter makes the argument that caste empowerment is occurring among Dalit women, on account of their participation in the MSK program as well as to the influence of Ambedkarism.

“Hindu” Cultural Domination: Dalits and Caste Apartheid

    South Asia contain the remnants of many ancient 'civilizations'. The Harappa culture was an extensive city culture around 2300 B.C. to 1700 B.C. These people had a script, indoor plumbing and traded with the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia (Thapar 1966). Later on, South Asia became home to the Brahmanic-Hindu caste system, one of the oldest forms of apartheid on record. Casteism in India, similar to racism in the US, is the belief that a particular caste or ethnic group is naturally inferior, so that its unequal treatment is justified. The caste system has survived for over two thousand years, despite numerous efforts to break it, and serves as a gross violation of basic human rights to over 200 million Dalits in South Asia and elsewhere.
    In the beginning, the words "Hindu" and "Hinduism" did not appear in the so called sacred Hindu texts. The terms was first used by Muslims in the 8th century AD to refer to all the non-Muslim inhabitants of South Asia, and it meant non-Muslim and nothing more. However, this false overgeneralization resulted in the wide diversity of people and cultures in South Asians all being regarded as "Hindus”, who belonged to a religion called "Hinduism" with Brahmins as the sole priests (Theertha1992:45).
    Moreover, Brahmanism became equated with Hinduism, with dire consequences for non-Brahmin groups, many of whom were and are, opposed its unegalitarian principles. Later on, the British administration perpetuated the myth of Hinduism. For instance, the census treated all South Asians other than Muslims and Christians as "Hindus”, and included each Dalit sub-group as Hindus, even though the Brahmins had excluded the entire "Untouchable" group from the caste system (Theertha1992:45).
    With India's independence, Brahmins and other "upper" castes moved quickly to occupy the void in political, economic and cultural power created by the departing British, and were able to gain control of all of India for the first time in the region's history. Although the terms "Hindu" and "Hinduism”, and "Brahmin" and "Brahminism" are used interchangeably here, there are major differences, expecially regarding the history and identity of Dalits and the “lower” castes.

The Origin of Caste in South Asia
    In the literature, there are several interpretations of the origin and history of caste. The term "caste" was first used by the Portuguese in South Asia in the early decades of the 16th century. The term originally included several meanings, including "family”, "stock”, "kind”, "strain”, "clan”, "tribe”, and "and "race”. The word was also used to designate various kinds of groups, besides Hindu ones, such as "the caste of Moors”, and "the caste of Christians”.
    The etymological derivation of the term "caste" from the Latin "castus" meaning "chaste" or "pure" was therefore only one among several possible meanings. It was only later that the Dutch and then the English used the term caste as a technical social term or a one-word restricted description of the thousands of groupings within "Hindu" society (Kishwar 1991:12). The point being made here is that caste in India was often an imposed and homogenised category used by European colonialisers, separate and apart from the term used in South Asia for caste, jat, which have its own internal dynamics.
    In discussing the origin of caste, Ambedkar (1916) explains that caste is a parcelling into bits of a larger cultural unit. He argues that in South Asia, there was only one caste to start with, that is, everyone had the same "caste”. There was class division, but not caste division. Ambedkar further argues that classes have become castes through imitation and excommunication. A class became a caste by substituting endogamy practices for exogamy ones. Ambedkar concluded that endogamy is the only characteristic of caste, and that this practice originated in the Brahmin class. Endogamy was then imitated by all the non-Brahmin classes, who in turn became endogamous castes.
    The term "caste" in South Asia usually refers to the varna system spoken of in Hindu spiritual texts. The varna system developed over time to include four divisions: Brahmans (the priestly caste), Kshatriyas (the warrior caste), and Vaishyas (the trading caste) - all of whom are believed to be twice-born - and the fourth group, Sudras (the servile caste). Dalits are defined as a group even inferior to the Sudras. Individual Indian castes number in the tens of thousands, and each is generally placed in one or another of the four varnas.
    According to G. S. Ghurye (1979), there are six major characteristics of the caste system in South Asia, which are: (i) segmental division of society, (ii) hierarchy, (iii) restrictions on feeding and social intercourse, (iv) civil and religious disabilities and privileges of the different sections, (v) lack of unrestricted choice of occupation, and (v) restriction on marriage (:2-22). Most of India’s caste groups will not inter-marry or inter-dine, and each one of them considers itself not only separate from other groups but also superior to others and hence discriminates against those who are below it (Kananaikil 1993b).
    Caste is a part of Hindu ideology which justifies the low status of the majority of the "lower" castes because they have bad karma, or sins of previous existences which has caused them to be born among the despised. This ideology correspondingly commands the "lower" castes to fulfil their caste duties in the name of dharma, which are obligations everyone has to perform, relative to the status they are born into, in order to maintain the Hindu social and cosmic order.
    The principles of the caste system and the rule of conduct for the different castes were codified in the 'shastras' or the instructional treatises of the Hindus which date back to the third century BC These were written by the 'Brahmins' or the priestly castes who legitimised the rule of the 'Kshatriya' castes or the warrior castes (Guha 1983). These rules were popularised through the 'puranas' or mythological stories.
    As the literature evolved over the millennias, so too has the caste system; to cite a few instances, the varna system is only mentioned later in the Riga Veda and vedic literature before the Purush Sutra does not even mention the fourth varna (Gupta 1991). It took many centuries of oppression and resistance before "caste" was finally recognized "as the birthright and badge of servility of the Hindus" (Theertha 1992:45).
    Brahminic ideologies of varna, karma, and dharma, are the basic justifications of caste exploitation and apartheid. With the growing influence of Brahminic ideology throughout South Asia during the Christian era, Brahmins' notions of caste became practised by many other groups. Brahmins came to enjoy many privileges at the expense of many non-Brahmin groups and women, whose lives became increasingly limited.
    Women have been equated to the "lower" castes and definite restrictions have been placed on both (Rege 1995:33). The life of a women and members of the "lower" castes/classes had little or no value. For example, anyone from the "upper" castes may kill a member of the "lower" castes without having to pay compensation. The "lower" castes are expected to be agricultural labourers,
whose dharma is to be humble towards 'the high born,' obedient and respectful to the master who employs them, and ready to fulfil their distinctive ritual duties (as drummers, and those in charge of funerals). In other words, Dalits are traditionally excluded, debased and subject to segregation and, at the same time, essential components of the social organisation which needs them both for the village economy and for the ritual functioning of the community (Viramma, Racine, and Racine 1997:308).
    One of the most effective weapons which has helped in the perpetuation of the caste system in early India was the denial of the right to education to women, Dalits and Sudras. These groups were prevented from acquiring knowledge and literacy as it was a sin and a crime to educate them, and only the three twice-born castes were admitted to Hindu religious schools to learn sanskrit, the language in which the sacred books were written and rituals performed (Thapar 1966). Further, they could not hold office under the state, and was prevented from acquiring property. Brahmins could take away "lower" castes' property at their pleasure. The duty and salvation of members of the "lower" castes and women were in serving the "higher" castes/classes and men respectively (Ambedkar 1946).

The Caste System in Global Perspective
    The four-fold varna system is not unique to India; many other ancient societies had similar divisions. In Iran about 700 BC, there was a myth that from the head of Yim came priests; from arms, soldiers; from stomach, agriculturists; and from the feet, artisans. In China around 1500 BC, the society was divided into four classes: nobles and government servants; agriculturists; artisans and businessmen. Earlier in Egypt (3200 BC), the society was divided into three groups: land owners, agricultural labourers, and slaves. And in Sumerian society (3500 BC) there were four classes: nobles, government servants and soldiers; ordinary citizens; agricultural workers; and slaves (Gupta 1991).
    Caste systems have been described in Bangladesh (Ali 1992), Nepal (Parish 1996), Sri Lanka (Jayanntha 1992; Jayaraman 1975; Hollup 1994), Japan (Miura 1990), Korea (Ayukai 1973), Africa and Europe (Diop 1987; Mbonimpa 1993; Onwubiko 1993), United States (Forbes 1988; Gordon 1995; Ogbu 1978; Willie 1989), Guatemala (Lutz 1994), and Mexico (Boyer 1997). There are also comparative studies on caste in South Asia (Leach 1971; Marriott 1965); the South Asian diaspora in Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, Surinam, Fiji, South Africa, and East Africa (Schwartz 1967); and between India and the United States (Das 1976; Berremen 1962; Verba, Ahmed and Bhatt 1971).
    The caste system has also been linked to the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe (Carsten 1967; Rajshekar 1994) and racism (Cox 1948; Leopold 1970; Poliakov 1974). These studies all point out that casteism and caste apartheid are important social problems in many parts of the world today, while this study explores why women on the bottom of caste hierarchies are among the most oppressed group in their societies.
    Another way to conceive of caste is to look at similarities between caste domination and other forms of oppression like slavery and serfdom. According to Scott (1990), each system,
represents an institutionalized arrangement for appropriating labor, goods, and services from a subordinate population. As a formal matter, subordinate groups in these forms of domination have no political or civil rights, and their status is fixed at birth. Social mobility, in principle if not practice, is precluded. The ideologies justifying domination of this kind include formal assumptions about inferiority and superiority which, in turn, find expression in certain rituals or etiquette regulating public contact between the strata (1990:x).
    The above comparison views caste as among the most severe conditions of powerlessness and dependency, and raises several important issues explored here. Comparable to this study, Scott in his own writing, "privilege the issues of dignity and autonomy, which have typically been seen as secondary to material exploitation" (1990:xi), explaining his reasoning as follows:
Slavery, serfdom, the caste system, colonialism, and racism routinely generate the practices and rituals of denigration, insult, and assaults on the body that seem to occupy such a large part of the hidden transcripts of their victims.... An element of personal terror infuses these relations -  a terror that may take the form of arbitrary beatings, sexual brutality, insults, and public humiliations. A particular slave, for example, may be lucky enough to escape such treatment but the sure knowledge that it could happen to her pervades the entire relationship (:x-xi).
Scott's privileging of dignity and autonomy underscores the point being made here about ending casteism and sexism in India, and the absolute necessity of implementing a Dalit women’s studies curriculum at all levels of Indian society.

The Origin of Untouchability
    Ambedkar and other scholars maintain that the origin of caste was not mainly based on race, occupation, economic or other factors, although these were related issues. They argued instead that caste is mainly related to power, and resulted from a religious and ideological conflict between different economic, political and cultural forces, which caused deep changes in Indian civilisation (Ambedkar 1946; 1948; 1957; 1987; Theertha 1992).
    These changes occurred in three major phases: (1) tribal, class divided Brahmanism; (2) revolutionary and egalitarian Buddhism; and (3) "counter-revolutionary" Hinduism, marked by the degradation of Dalits and women (Omvedt 1995). Although this subaltern version of South Asian antiquity is largely ignored by historians and school texts, nonetheless it does explain many discrepancies contained in the mainstream annals of Hinduism, for example, why during the Vedic period was there no untouchability, and why until the 2nd century AD, there was impurity, but not untouchability?
    During the first phase of tribal, class divided Brahmanism, priests were able to control the common people, with the support of religious doctrines, and their authority was even greater than that of kings. Brahmins, the priestly class, had many privileges even over kings, such as, the king upon meeting a Brahmin on the road had to give way to the Brahmin, and a Brahmin learned in the sacred texts was free from taxes (Ambedkar 1946).
    At the dawn of the Christian era, during the second phase of revolutionary and egalitarian religions, Buddhism was dominant throughout South Asia due in part to the powerful Ashoka rulers' support and influence (Ambedkar 1957; 1987). Buddhism then presented a serious challenge to Brahminism's bid for religious supremacy in the region which led to the third stage of "counter-revolutionary" Hinduism.
    According to Theertha:
Indian kings almost invariably encouraged Buddhism side by side with Brahmanism, even when they had been raised to power with the help of Brahmans. Brahmanism could therefore be permanently established only with the disappearance of Buddhism and also of all Indian rulers (1992: 109).
To cite an instance, a reward of 100 dinar was offered by Brahmin figures like Pushyamitra for the head of every Buddhist monk. Ambedkar and Theertha both argued that Buddhists were subjugated and defined as Untouchables by the Brahmins, and were then forced to live outside of caste Hindu dominated village communities. Untouchables or Dalits were then considered as even more demeaning than Sudras, as they were avarna or outside of the caste system.
    There were many centuries of resistance by Dalits, but eventually, Buddhism was all but wiped out in India and the Buddha himself became co-opted into the Hindu pantheon of gods. Dalit authors are of the opinion that untouchability was not only part of an oppressive religious system, but also an economic system of exploitation which was worse than slavery (Ambedkar 1948; 1957; 1987).
    Untouchability was made a legal offence by India's Parliament in 1955; nevertheless in practice it still exists, especially in rural areas. Untouchability as a social institution was and is kept alive by the use of brutal force. Caste Hindus insist on enforcing the inferiority of the Dalits in many ways, and if they try to improve their standards of living they are cruelly persecuted (Nath 1987).
    Although former "Untouchable" groups have converted to Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Islam, Sikhism and other religions, they are still considered as Untouchables by caste Hindus and their own "upper" caste co-religionists (Raj and Raj 1993). Yet only "Hindu" and Sikh scheduled castes can claim the benefits of reservation. Even the process of approximation to the "upper" castes' code of conduct which Srinivas (1966) has described as Sanskritisation could not help the Dalits to cross the barrier of untouchability. Dalits all over India have tried to change their ways, their marriage practices, and their caste names; however, all these have little effect on changing their caste status.

Caste, Class and Education
    The Mandal Commission (GOI 1980), identified 3400 castes and sub-castes in India. Those regarded as the "upper castes" constitute less than 15 percent of the Indian population, can and do practice caste against all other groups. Those regarded as the lowest castes, "Untouchables" and tribals, constitute 20 percent of the population, but they cannot employ caste practices against others. Between these two extremes lies the middle category called the other Backward Classes (OBCs), who make up about 52 percent of the population.
    Other Backward Classes (OBCs) can only practice caste in relation to Dalits, not against the "upper castes" (Kananaikil 1993b). According to the latest annual report of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) Commission (1989), both groups combined owned only two percent of India's land. In the fields of trade and industry, they have made only 0.2 percent gain since independence. A thirty-five (35) year old respondent explain, "due to casteism there was no school for SCs in village in the olden days”.
    In his book, States and Minorities (1947), Ambedkar called the village community a sink of localism, and a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness and communalism. Dalits are commonly clustered together in segregated hamlets at the edge of a village. Although constituting a vast number of the total population, they are a small and vulnerable minority in any given region, making resistance to exploitation and violence very difficult.     Ambedkar indicated that Dalits, as the mass of rural, landless labourers, are entirely dependent upon such employment as the Hindus may choose to give them and on such wages as the Hindus may find it profitable to pay. In the villages in which they live, they cannot engage in any trade or occupation owing to untouchability. Since few Hindus will deal with them, there are few ways of earning a living open to `Untouchables' (Ambedkar 1947).
    Kancha Ilaiah (1990) argues that there are many socio-economic and cultural differences between Sudras and Dalits on the one hand (Dalitbahujan or Dalit majority), and Hindus on the other, in the contexts of childhood, family life, market relations, Gods and Goddesses, and death. Ilaiah, who grew up in a South Indian village in the early 1950s, writes about the negative attitudes of "upper" caste Hindu teachers towards Dalitbahujan students, the caste Hindu dominated curriculum, and other experiences which were part of his education:
As we were growing up, stepping into "higher" classes, the textbooks taught us stories which we had never heard in our families. The stories of Rama and Krishna, poems from the Puranas, the names of two epics called Ramayana and Mahabharatha occurred repeatedly. Right from early school up to college, our Telugu textbooks were packed with these Hindu stories. For Brahmin-Baniya students these were their childhood stories, very familiar not only in story form but in the form of Gods that they worshipped....
I distinctly remember how alien all these names appeared to me. Many of the names were not known in my village. The name of Kalidasa was as alien to us as the name of Shakespeare. The only difference was that one appeared in Telugu textbooks while the other appeared in English textbooks... The language of textbooks was not the one that our communities spoke. Even the basic words were different. Textbook Telugu was Brahmin Telugu, whereas we were used to a production-based communicative Telugu... It is not merely a difference of dialect; there is difference in the very language itself (1996:13).
    This author argues that even though Sudras and Dalits live together with Hindus in civil society, they exist in two cultural worlds that are not merely different, but opposed to each other. Like Anandhi (1995), Kakade (1990) and others, Ilaiah argues that Hindus' interests are against the interest of Dalitbahujans, and moreover, that Hindu mythology is created through the destruction of Dalitbahujan ethos (1996).
    Consequently, the religious beliefs and practices of subordinate caste groups are quiet often based on principles that are contradictory to those of the Brahmanical religion (Chatterjee 1994; Khare 1983; O'Hanlon 1985). For example, Gupta makes the claim that there is no one caste ideology (dharma), but several, sharing some principles in common but articulated at variance and even in opposition to one another (1984).
    Although Ilaiah's claim for cultural and religious differences among the "lower" castes is very important, nonetheless, his case for Sudra-Dalit solidarity may be overstated, especially for South India where this study is located. The caste dynamics in South India is very different from the four-fold varna system prevalent in North India due to the absence of Vaishya and Kshatriya caste groups in the south.
    As a result, the small minority of Brahmins in South India have had to modify their close associations with Vaishyas and Kshatriyas, the other twice-born castes in the north, by building alliances with the Sudra castes in mutual opposition to the outcastes. Despite differences, the two groups formed one configuration and pushed the Dalits further out from the caste communities. So the conflict in South India is not only between "upper" and "lower" castes, but caste communities, defined as Hindu human societies, and outcaste communities, defined as non-Hindu and non-human societies, or Dalits.

Dalits and the Struggle for Self-Identity

    The Marathi word Dalit was chosen by an "Untouchable" group to refer to themselves and it means literally "ground”, or "broken or reduced to pieces”. There is in the word, Dalit, an inherent denial of pollution, karma, and justified caste hierarchy. Dalit, or downtrodden, became the most acceptable term in the 1980s for the various outcaste communities (Zelliot 1992:74).
    Dalits are more a self-conscious group rather than a traditional caste (Nath 1987:3). Bhagwat writes that the term Dalit stands for change and revolution, because "we feel that the voices and protests of Dalit women are almost invisible" (1995:2). Dalitism includes not only marginal status in economic sphere but also similar marginal status in cultural, political, religious and other domains (Punalekar 1995:8). However, in a sense, the term Dalit is an imposed category, for many "Untouchable" or former "Untouchable" groups do not identify themselves with the term, and furthermore, none of the women in this study identified themselves as such.
    Dalits are by no means a homogenous category. Among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) there exist over 1,000 "castes" and "sub-castes" such as: Bhangi, a large scavenging caste of the North; Chamars; Madiga; Mahar; and Mang. They are a great deal of distinction from one Dalit group to another in manners and customs, and there are gradation and caste taboos among themselves. To illustrate, a Chamar regards a Mahar as his inferior and the latter regards the Mang as still inferior in the scale of humanity. Language has also been a dividing line and only recently has there been a substantial pool of Dalits with a command of several languages, including English, who could serve as human links between Dalit movements in different linguistic regions (Ilaiah 1996; Joshi 1986).
    Each Dalit caste has also been defined by the same social rules of endogamy, with marriage occurring exclusively within the caste community, that shape the entire Indian caste system. The result has been the development of a variety of distinctive Dalit cultures, with significant differences in the direction and pace of mobilisation for change. Frequently it also means social conflicts that make co-operative efforts difficult (Joshi 1986:4). Dalits share in common certain features of poverty and degradation due to the contemptuous treatment they suffered at the hands of the caste Hindus (Nath 1987:17).

Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement
    The modern movement for the liberation of Dalits in India was led by Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who was born into an Untouchable family on April 14, 1891, in Mhow, Maharashtra. After nearly ten years of study in the US and England, Ambedkar returned to India in 1923 to lead the Dalits and was eventually appointed as Law Minister in India's first independent government, with the responsibility for writing the constitution. After many decades of struggle against Hindu domination and oppression, Ambedkar left the Hindu faith and converted to Buddhism in 1956, along with millions of his followers, just before his death (Zelliot 1992).
    Ambedkar used an ancient form of resistance among Dalits, that of de-Hinduisation, a the term that implies complete distance and protest against Hinduism, and acceptance of any other non-Hindu religion like Islam, Christianity, Sikhism or Buddhism, with a purpose of getting rid of untouchability and to developing their moral and financial conditions (Kshirsagar 1994). Ambedkar has been revered as a hero among many Dalit and Sudra groups, who emulate his path by pursuing educational opportunities.
    Ambedkar has had an enormous influence on Dalits all over India (Kadam 1991; Mahajan 1994; Mahar 1972; Parvathamma 1973; Ram 1995), and there has been a continuous growth and change in the Ambedkar movement, including developments in the field of Buddhism, and the Dalit Sahitya literature movement in Maharasthra, Gujarat and Karnataka. In the late 1960s, a group of Dalit activists, poets and writers formed the Dalit Panthers in the slums of Bombay, adopting a confrontational style to mobilise their neighbourhoods against discrimination and violence (Dalit Panthers 1973; Limbale 1989; Murugkar 1991).
    As a consequence of all these activities, Dalits are now emerging as a political power in several parts of India (Gupta 1980; 1985). In response, there is a concerted attempt made by caste Hindus to discredit Ambedkar on the one hand, and simultaneously to "Hinduise" Ambedkar and Dalit movement (Guru 1991).
Ending Casteism
    A popular assertion made is that since the adoption of the new constitution, The Abolition of Untouchability Act of 1955, and the provision of reservations, the old Hindu social and economic order has been transformed on account of it being no longer officially approved and adhered to. This position ignores the fact that legal measures in isolation do not change institutions, without concomitant changes in the social, cultural and economic forces that shape these institutions.
    It is likewise argued that in contemporary India, the traditional identification of caste and work has become looser in certain respects, just as the basic inegalitarianism of the caste system has been challenged by different groups. Nonetheless, these changes in status have taken pace mainly within the traditional ideology and not in opposition to it. And since the caste system gives rights and privileges to "high" caste persons over those from the "low" castes, the former will continue to enjoy their rights as long as the social and religious order treats them as superior.
    As a consequence, the social and economic disabilities laid down in the orthodox system still persists in varying degrees, especially in the rural areas where caste is practised by almost everyone. And although it is only the Hindu religion which has legitimised the caste system, the members of all religions have come under the influence of caste. Given the social system, most Dalits have adopted the convenient response of practising caste (Kananaikil 1993b).
    In recognition of persistent inequalities among Dalits, before and after independence, a series of reservation policies and programs have been instituted to make education and government employment available to economically disadvantaged castes. Anti-discrimination laws and reservation policies have met with small but important successes in independent India, but lack of awareness and implementation of laws against the common practice of casteism, refusal to hire educated Dalits to fill reserved government posts, the collusion between state and local authorities and local elite to maintain the status quo, and a variety of other reasons has hindered their progress (Chitnis 1980; Darshankar 1991; Galanter 1984; Kakade 1990; Khan 1994; Kuchabhan 1995; Rathnaiah 1991; Sharma 1995; Tripathy 1994; Venkateswarlu 1990).
    Furthermore, the experiences of poor, rural Dalit women are different from Dalit males, from other Indian women, and those of other poor and rural groups. Consequently, the vast majority of affirmative action policies and programs which are targeted towards the rural areas, the poor, women or Dalits do not necessarily reach perhaps the most disadvantaged group, that is, poor, rural Dalit women.
    In addition to anti-casteist laws and policies, there is a long history of anti-caste movements in South Asia in which women played a major role (Calman 1985; O'Hanlon 1985; Omvedt 1995; Sharma 1994; Theertha 1992), and Dalits have always resisted the Hindu caste system and domination (Ambedkar 1990; Jogdan 1991; Kshirsagar 1994; Rajshekar 1978; Zelliot 1992).
    Presently, Dalits are slowly gaining access to educational opportunities and are becoming more assertive of their rights, though this places them in direct conflict with the small minority of middle and "upper" caste Hindus, and the more populous Other Backward Castes (OBCs), who together control access to most of the India's political, environmental, cultural and economic resources (Bhatt 1975; Gill 1990; GOI 1980; Kothari 1991; 1992; 1993; Rao 1977; Shah 1994).
    India's constitution abolished untouchability but left the Brahmanical caste system intact. Ambedkar wanted the abolition of the caste system and felt that this was only possible by rejecting the Hindu religious books giving sanctity to it. This study likewise argues for the need of educational reform to end casteism, through removal of all justifications of the caste system in school texts, and by way of inclusion of a Dalit curriculum.
    Before and after independence, Ambedkar analysed the effects of the caste system in the elections and proved that the Dalits were completely disenfranchised by the joint electorate system with reservations for scheduled caste representatives (Ambedkar 1947; 1955). Instead of reservations in legislatures and the present election system, in 1956, Ambedkar advocated proportional representation and cumulative voting in a system composed of two or three constituencies (Ambedkar 1947; Prakash 1993). In States and Minorities, Ambedkar in addition argued for the creation of smaller States as a safeguard for small minority populations against communal oppression from dominant majority communities (1947).

The Caste System and Gender

    Whereas females constitute about half of India's population, it is the case that they too are deemed "polluting" according to Hindu patriarchal ideology and practice (Sarkar and Butalia 1995). In many ways, the practice of casteism and untouchability is linked to endogamy as it serves to reinforce divisions among the castes, and to further limit "upper" caste females' sexuality. Uma Charkravarti comments, "caste hierarchy and gender hierarchy are the organising principles of the Brahmanical social order and are closely interconnected" (1993:579).
    Women are the gateways of caste-system and the crucial pivot on whose purity-sanctity axis the caste hierarchy is constructed (Bhagwat 1995:4). Both women and Dalits have been defined as impure, of sinful birth and as having a polluting presence; and, both in general, had to observe practices of verbal difference, temporal distance, and dress codes, as an index of their subordinate status. Commenting on the interconnections of gender and caste ideologies, Dalit feminist author, Aruna Gnanadason, writes:
The coming of patriarchal Hinduism and its caste system into India institutionalised the oppression of the outcaste Dalits and this had a particularly deleterious effect on women. The control on women's sexuality was essential for the development of a patriarchal caste hierarchy, both for the maintenance of caste and for the legitimisation and control of inheritance. Restrictions of time, place and space were therefore imposed on women to ensure the purity of caste by avoiding the danger of inter-caste 'pollution' (1990:114).
    According to the Hindu ideology, codified in the laws of Manu, women were not only denied education, but they must forever be dependent on men. Manu wrote (V.148): "...in childhood a female must be subject to her father, in youth to her husband, when her lord is dead to her sons; a woman must never be independent”. A wife is reduced to the level of a slave in the matter of property as Manu wrote (IX.416): "A wife, a son, and a slave, these three are declared to have no property; the wealth which they earn is (acquired) for him to whom they belong" (quoted in Ambedkar 1977:22).
    In terms of the interconnections between caste and gender, Ambedkar argues that the problem of maintaining caste endogamy ultimately leads to a disparity between the marriageable units of the two sexes within such a closed system. `Surplus' women and men produced many problems to a particular caste, and therefore the Brahmins created four customs which were used to conveniently maintain the ratio of two sexes:
(a) burning the widow with the diseased husband,
(b) compulsory widowhood,
(c) imposing celibacy on the widower, and
(d) wedding him to a girl not yet marriageable (Ambedkar 1916:14).
    Ambedkar explained that those castes that are nearest to the Brahmins have imitated all the three customs, i.e., sati, enforced widowhood, and girl marriage. Those castes that are just beneath the Brahmins (Kshatriyas) have imitated enforced widowhood and girl marriage; other castes that are still lower (Vaishyas) have imitated only girl marriage, and those furthest off (Sudras) have imitated only the belief in the caste principle (Ambedkar 1916). These issues are increasingly important for Dalit women because of the prevalent practice of sanskritisation occurring among the "lower" castes and Dalits, resulting in more patriarchal and misogynist practices.
    In support of Ambedkar's linking Brahminism to more patriarchal practices, McGilvray's study (1982) of Tamils in Sri Lanka suggests that where patrilineal principles are weak, then Brahmanical beliefs are correspondingly marginal or irrelevant. Likewise, Kapadia's study of a rural Tamil Nadu village found a similar pattern among non-Brahmin cultures, such as "the prominence and lavish celebration of female puberty rites and the importance of the menstruation horoscope... neither of which are given much importance by the Brahmins" (1994:861).
    Contrary to the notion that women had no property rights in Hindu society until 1956, women's property rights were part of ancient and modern legal history. In Tamil society, there is a long history of women owning, controlling and disposing personal property (Wadley 1980). In modern times, there is a tradition of land passing from mother to daughter in a female line of descent (Mukund 1992). These variations prove that women are not only conscious about their rights to land and other resources, but are active participants in shaping cultural and religious practices in South Asia.
    The literature shows that historically, Brahmanic patriarchal ideologies encountered powerful cultural and religious resistance, and there were intra-cultural variations and different regional patterns regarding the status of women. Despite the influence of Brahmanic patriarchal ideologies, both elite and populist Hindu discourse and sensibilities regarding woman carry a deep impress of mother-goddess cults and forms of worship (EPW 1990). These female sensibilities serve as indicators of the strength of feminine cultural and religious resistance in the region.
    Indeed, resistance against untouchability and the Hindu caste system has remained strong among Dalits and women. The clues of this resistance of the subaltern were customarily written out from the formal histories of South Asia, yet they were alive in the lived experiences of Dalit women and men, and are found in the everyday acts of protest, in reform movements, religious conversion, and rebellion, from the pre-colonial to post-colonial periods. Furthermore, many studies document that currently, throughout India, Dalit women and other women are actively resisting gender, caste and class oppression to educate and empower themselves, other women and men (Joshi 1986; Sumitra 1988).
    Since independence, a succession of policies and programs have been conceived to make education and government employment available to poor women; nonetheless, due to patriarchal control, urban-rural biases, middle-class agendas, corruption, exploitation, and a variety of other reasons, these programs have had little success (Goela 1992; Goyal 1988; Jain et al. 1988; Raj 1991; Rath and Rath 1990; Savara 1990). Commenting on the modest levels of literacy achievements among Indian women after forty years of public education funding, Bhasin (1985a) writes:
illiteracy cannot be wiped out without a wider struggle to eradicate poverty, exploitation and maldistribution of  resources in society ... which prevents 75 percent women from not only being literate but also from being treated as equals. Which also prevents them from leading a life free of disease, hunger and exploitation (:2).
    It must be stated that although caste, education, employment and other gains made by poor Indian women since independence may appear to be limited at the national and regional levels, these gains are nevertheless very significant for the individual woman involved. These particular instances of poor women's empowerment is part of centuries of female resistance in South Asia, as the recorded history of the last 3,000 years contains many examples of women who were able to resist gender and religious oppression to become educated, important figures (Horner 1990; Madhavananda and Majumdar 1993; Ramabai 1982).
    Women's status and condition is affected by their caste, class and family status; still the vast majority of them were denied education over time (Sangari and Vaid 1989). In ancient times, Dalit women were denied the use of public roads and transport. They could not dress in the manner of other Hindu women nor could they wear jewellery. They were also exploited sexually by "upper" caste men and as domestic labour by women of the "upper" caste (Joshi 1986).

Caste Status of Dalits in the Villages
    Caste in this study is viewed as part of personal and group identity and also as a process which is socially constructed. In terms of caste identity, not all of the respondents are comfortable in discussing their caste with the research team, especially the young women of the Kendra. Probes for sub-caste, or prior-caste identity among Christians and non-Christians alike, proved difficult for some respondents.
    Similarly, in her study of urban Dalit women in Maharashtra, Pawde (1995) found that Christian Dalit women mostly try to hide their previous castes and only one or two percent of the women admitted that their forefathers were Dalits. However, MSK teachers and administrators alike state that all the MSK Kendra, AE and NFE students come from Scheduled Caste (SC) and SC-Christian groups.
    Of the thirty-three respondents, six identify themselves as Christians; three as Holeya (Dalit subcaste); two as Madiga (Dalit sub-caste); and the rest simply as Scheduled Castes (SCs). These sub-groups are further divided by cultural and religious practices, in relation to the dominant Hindu social order. Most of the Christians in the sample group are Christian Dalits; however, members of this group are not considered as a caste and do not receive preferential treatment as SCs (Dalits), for example, in reservations and quota allocations for university admissions, scholarships, government jobs, and so on.
    Participant observation in the villages reveals that many of the SC women come from families who are Buddhists, and are followers of Ambedkar, yet they do not claim Buddhism as an identity, but categorised themselves as SC. This is not surprising as only "Hindu" Dalit groups benefit from government reservations. However small and inaccessible, reservations serve as a strong motivation for Dalits to pursue education in the hope of gaining white collar employment. Dalits who convert to Buddhism or Christianity cannot apply for reserved seats or jobs since by virtue of their conversion, they are no longer considered a "backward" community even though they remain the same in all other respects.
    At the district level MSK meetings, the vast majority of participants are Dalits, and Dalit Christians and tribals formed a small percentage; and there are only a few Muslim women present in the programs. The predominance of Dalits in the MSK program reflects in part their numerical majority among oppressed communities in the district, as well as the mobilisation strategy used by the MSK program.
    The caste status of Dalit respondents living in Bidar district varies from village to village, depending on various factors such as size of the village, history of the village, size of Dalit population, overall number of religions and castes, the presence of "higher" castes, number and location of wells, and so on. Almost all of the respondents indicated that there was casteism and discrimination against Dalits in their village related to environmental, economic, social and cultural resources.
    Several women indicated that in their villages, there are social tensions and problems between Muslims, Lingayats (dominant Hindu sub-caste) and Dalits. Tensions with Dalit Christians and Madigas versus Holyas and other “Hindu” Dalits are likewise raised. Some respondents acknowledge that only Christian Dalits and scheduled caste people come to the Sangha, crèche, AE and NFE classes.
    The prevalence of residential segregation of Dalits is suggested by most all of the respondents who reside in the SC colony in their village. In response to the question, "how many different castes are there in the village?" one respondent, Laxmiamma, answers,
In the village, there are Muslims and Hindus. In Hindus, there is SC/ST. ST are Madigas. Then, there are Lingayats, Kurbur, Carpenter, Dobi (laundry) caste, and so on.
A follow-up question was asked, "are there separate colonies among the Hindu castes in the village?" to which Laxmiamma replies,
There are separate houses, but not separate colonies. The castes are all living nearby, in clusters. The carpenter caste live together, the Lingayats live together, and so on.
These last remarks indicate that residential segregation occur in this village among all castes, and participant observation of numerous villages confirm this.
    By way of illustration, in Laxmiamma’s village, the Muslim colony, with a mosque and twenty huts, is located at one end of the village, next to the Scheduled Castes (SC) colony, and adjacent to the main road. A brick wall separates the Muslim colony from the adjoining SC houses, which are located away from the main road. The majority of land surrounding the village are owned by Lingayats, who reside at the other end of the village along the main road where an old temple is located. Various caste Hindu groups live in the middle of the village where a new Hindu temple is located along the main road.
    All most all of the respondents indicate that there is caste discrimination against Dalits in the village related to environmental, economic, social and cultural resources. To cite an instance, in terms of access to environmental resources, one 14 year old girl discloses, "the high caste people will not allow us to go to their borewell for water”. And when asked the question, "describe some of the problems in your village”, Mayawati reply:
There are some caste problems. The "high" caste people will not allow us to go to their borewell to take water. So there is a separate borewell for the lower caste. This is a problem still.
    In villages in which the best well is located outside the Dalit colony, Dalits have problems entering caste Hindu communities for water; while in the few villages where the best well is located inside the Scheduled Caste (SC) colony, lack of water forces caste Hindu women to break caste barriers and enter the Dalit area to collect water. Another respondent accounts, "the SCs have no land and have to migrate for work”.
    In some villages where there is a large number of caste Hindus and "upper" castes, Dalits are not admitted into Hindu temples. One more student, an eighteen year old, declares, "in the village, the "high" caste people never allow us into the Hanuman (Hindu) temple”, while another young woman indicates that Dalits are not accepted into the "upper" caste community in the village. In other villages where there is a large and growing Muslim population and the absence of "upper" caste groups, attempts are made by "lower" caste Hindus to construct a "Hindu majority" by "Hinduizing" Dalits in permitting them access to temples and so forth.
    In regard to cultural exploitation, the respondents are all aware of caste tensions in village, and many of the younger women confess that they lived in fear. By way of illustration, one young respondent, Bharti, expounds on caste issues in her village:
There is the caste problem. One day, when I was fetching water from the well, one Lingayat women came to the well to take some water to the temple. She scolded me for touching her vessel, even through I did not touch it. There is a quarrel between the Lingayats (caste Hindus) and the Scheduled Caste people, and the Lingayats did some banamati (witchcraft) on some of the SC people.
    Respondents indicate that in their villages, there are social tensions and problems between Muslims, caste Hindu Lingayats, and Dalits. Tensions with Dalit Christians and with Madigas versus Holyas and other Dalits over Sangha resources are likewise raised. Some respondents said that only Christian Dalits and Scheduled Castes (SCs) attend the Sangha, crèche, AE and NFE classes.
    Notwithstanding these tensions and differences, participant observation at several district level MSK meetings which brings women together from all over the district for various training reveal that the vast majority of participants intermingle and share their experiences with each other freely. Rural women and girls from Dalit groups like Madiga and Holeya formed the vast majority of the women at these large gatherings; Dalit Christians and Lambani tribals formed a smaller percentage, and there are a few Muslim women present as well.
    Concerning cultural and economic issues, the respondents are nearly all aware of caste tensions in their villages, and many of the younger women admitted that they lived in fear. Casteism remains a weighty issue all the respondents have to deal with, and to cite an instance of several issues related to caste, one young respondent, Bharti, makes clear the situation in her village:
There is the caste problem. One day, when I was fetching water from the well, one Lingayat women came to the well to take some water to the temple. She scolded me for touching her vessel, even through I did not touch it. There is a quarrel between the Lingayats and the scheduled caste people, and the Lingayats did some banamati (witchcraft) on some of the SC people.
    One belief prevalent among respondents, banamati, is a form of witchcraft practised throughout India, although it is known by different names, for instance sonium in Andhra Pradesh. To a large extent, only the lower castes suffer from its psychological effects, and are afraid of it being practised against them. For instance, another researcher found that Dalit women believe in witchcraft, black magic, haunted spirit, and the evil eye (Pawde 1995:153).
    The vast majority of respondents are afraid of caste Hindus using banamati against them or a family member. The widespread fear of banamati forms a significant part of Dalit women's life; and their fears of witchcraft are used by caste Hindus as a device in keeping Dalits in their prescribed, subservient positions in the rural economy. A case in point, an early program administrator admits that banamati is being used to break the women's Sanghas.
    To cite another instance, one respondent said that banamati is practised against the Christians and Dalits in her village by the caste Hindus because the "SCs are getting up" in social and economic status. Several other respondents report having suffered from banamati attacks and personal tragedies related to banamati. When asked about it, one young respondent declares, "my sister died because of it”, and one more insists, "my father's first wife and three children died because of banamati”, while a third insinuates, "villagers made it to my brother; he died within a year”.
    The maternal aunt of one young respondent disclosed that six months after her husband left her because of their childless marriage, she suffered a banamati attack while working in the factory. She fell into a machine and lost one arm. Kendra student, Bharti, accounts:
To every house of the SC colony, they do something to the women in the house, my mother also. Sometimes my mother would have fever and her palms aches as if something is nailing her. I am scared of them... All the girls in this school are scared of banamati.
Bharti continues:
One woman of the village, about forty-five years old, started to vomit pieces of glass. Then, she never allowed anybody near to her, not even her own children or husband. Even animals which came near her, she would throw stones at them to keep them away. She had small children, but their grandparents took care of them. She became mad, but they took her to someplace and after some treatment, she is now recovering. We are trying to catch hold of the Lingayats who are doing these things to us.

Women in Dalit Cultures
    A review of studies on Dalit women and culture divulge that a large percentage of the research is conducted by non-Dalits and males. While they offer significant insights into the lives of Dalit women, many are replete with gender and caste bias. There are a few recent studies on Dalit culture and women (Kapadia 1994; Pawde 1995; Viramma, Racine and Racine 1997), however one group of rsearchers conclude, "there has been a failure in delving deeper into the complex cultural and psychological factors which retard the progress of women" (Aranha, Fernando and Mahale 1991:89). This sub-section on women in Dalit culture addresses some of these issues.
    Dalits have historically been oppressed, and consequently Dalit cultures have evolved differently and contain many aspects in opposition to Hindu religious domination. However, as a socio-religious minority, Dalits have had to exist in relation to the dominant social order, and have adopted many elements of this order. Dalit cultures can therefore simultaneously serve as an important source of freedom, inspiration, and resistance; and as an oppresive influence in the lives of Dalit women and other Dalit sub-castes. The specifics of each cultural practice have to be explored in order to determine its effect on Dalit individuals and groups.
    Since each aspect of Dalit social organisation influences each other, it is not easy to define the boundaries of each aspect, or where one particular aspect starts and the another ends. Also, it must be borne in mind that Dalit social organisations are undergoing rapid changes as a result of the individual and collective efforts of Dalits, and in response to regional, national and global socio-economic forces which are shaping local contexts.
    There are major cultural differences between caste Hindus and Dalits in terms of gender, language, religion, training of children, and so on. Dalits have preserved their customs and rituals, social institutions and some customary laws despite pressure from Brahmanic-Hinduism, non-literacy, violence and exploitation. As an outcome of these customs, Dalit women enjoy more freedom than the "upper" caste Hindu women, for example, the right to divorce and widow remarriage (Das 1995:73). Ilaiah further argues:
Since Dalitbahujans do not have property reserves and every individual must therefore work for the family, women are thoroughly integrated into the productive labour system. Not only that, the women are the main driving force of Dalitbahujan society... the skills that Dalitbahujan women have are enormous. They are excellent soil examiners, planters, breeders and selectors of seeds. They have huge stores of medical knowledge. Most of these skills are absolutely lacking among 'upper' caste women (1996:128).
    Nonetheless, this does not mean that Dalit women are better off, because they suffer more from harassment, persecution and exploitation than "upper" caste women. Although there is gender stratification in Indian society, caste\class stratification tends to be much greater. A case in point, "upper" caste women, as members of the dominant castes\classes, have much greater access to education and "white-collar" employment opportunities than do "lower" caste women. Moreover, exploitation of Dalit women’s labor is not limited to "upper" caste men as attempts of unionization by mostly female Dalit domestic workers have been viewed negatively by their "upper" caste women employers and strikes have resulted in loss of jobs for most of these women (Rege 1995:28).
    The percentage of female headed households among the "lower" castes is as large as 70 to 75 percent. This is due to several factors: the incidence of desertion is huge and even in cases where the husband is present, it is the women's income that goes towards the survival of the family. (Rege 1995:30). Also on account of Dalit women being both economically dependent and looked down upon, they become victims of "high" caste sexual violence far more frequently than do non-Dalit women.
    As a subaltern community, Dalit cultures have many contradictory elements and structures which appear as forms of compliance to dominant Hindu cultures. Moreover, lack of education and awareness often lead Dalit women to internalize their own oppression due to Dalit and Hindu patriarchy. To cite an instance, Dalit women are accustomed to observing the taboos of their own sub-castes, including sub-caste purity/pollution rules, sub-caste endogamy, and other exploitative customs and traditions. In this study, only one case of inter-caste marriage was found among the sample as almost all of the SC, Christian and Madiga females marry within their particular sub-groups.
    Rathnaiah (1991) also discovered that only one percent of his Mala respondents had inter-caste marriages, while another researcher unearthed that Dalit women do not permit family members to marry out of the sub-caste, and will rebuke a person for breaking the taboos of her/his sub-castes (Pawde 1995:160).
    Traditionally, there was no dowry system for women among Dalits. The importance of a woman in the family was taken for granted by Dalit communities as it was the custom for the bridegroom's side to go to the girl's parents to ask whether they are ready to marry their daughter to their son. However, the impact of other non-Dalit communities has slowly introduced the dowry system among Dalits (Pawde 1995:153).
    Dalit groups often imitate traditions and customs of caste Hindus, for example, they have patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence. The wife of a deceased person is not entitled to any share from the property of her husband, but she is supposed to be looked after by her male children (Rathnaiah1991). To cite another instance, there are traditional Indian concepts that if a woman is given freedom there is a possibility of her being spoiled. Additionally, both a women's labor and earnings are often viewed as the 'property' of her husband (Kapadia 1994; 1995).
    In terms of economic organisation, Dalits may be categorised according to the tasks they perform, their work, whether or not they own land, if they are part of a co-operative or union, for example the Women's Federation discussed at the end in chapter five. Regarding political organisations, Dalits may belong to village-level and regional panchayats (councils) which are government supported, and to political parties in civil society varying from Dalit groups such as the Bahujan Samaj Party, to left formations like the Janata Dal, to secular parties such as the Congress Party, to the caste Hindu, right wing groups like the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP). Dalit women also belong to panchayats, women's organisations, and political parties.
    In terms of social organisation, Dalits might participate in various forms of education activities, support groups, and caste associations, which have overlapping social, political and cultural goals. And in terms of cultural organisation, Dalits belong to various religions and spiritual organisations, believe in witchcraft, participate in celebrations, and create and perform poetry, songs and music. These aspects of Dalit social organisation are explored in more detail in this chapter.
    Dalit sub-castes have their own caste panchayat (council) which deals with matters pertaining to female-male relationships, inter-family, and intra-family disputes. There is a forum for Dalit women's deliberations, known as Ammalakkala Muchchatlu (the discussion of mothers and sisters) in Andhra Pradesh, which are open and juridical in nature, and involve a female understanding for resolving problems. The Ammalakkala forums engage in constant debates inside the village as well as in the fields relating to issues the women have such as children, work, land, and domestic violence (Ilaiah 1996).
    In general, Dalit women in every religion are traditionally religious and worship their gods, adhere to their faith in religion and culture. Dalit gods, goddesses and festivals are local, and sometimes even specific to one village, and Dalits do not attend Hindu temples where they could meet villagers belonging to all castes. Dalit children are socialised differently in terms of their caste language and occupations, which are based on their material conditions and requirements for survival. The written language and ideology of Hinduism are distinct from the oral traditions of Dalits, except for the caste prohibitions and purity/pollution rules they are compelled to observe (Ilaiah 1996).
    Kapadia found that a married woman is welcome to return to her natal home after marriage, and during her period of stay she is expected to help natal kin with agricultural labor. When a Dalit married woman returns home, she is an economic asset to her natal family for she immediately adds to the household income as free agricultural labor and through wage work. In all four non-Brahmin castes there were many cross-kin marriages, and many married women living only a few doors away from their mothers, brothers and children (Kapadia 1994:858-60).
    In addition to adopting of various aspects of Hindu culture, Dalit cultures consist of elements which serve as forms of resistance to the Hindu authority, including songs and stories, and especially festivals. Festivals allow expression of buttoned down emotions through celebration, dance, mockery, and fun. One woman talks about the festivals in her village as follows:
There are twelve festivals, one per month, but the festival in April is the biggest one; for the women, Nag Panchammi in August. The daughters are called to the parental home and given a new sari. They take milk and snakes to an anthill where there are snakes and do puja (offering).
    According to this respondent, the biggest festival in her village for Dalits is Ambedkar's Jayanti (birthday) celebration in April. Participant observation in the district town of Bidar on this day reveal that tens of thousands of Dalits from different sub-castes all over the district gather around Ambedkar's Circle in the centre of the town to watch a all-day procession in honour of Ambedkar. There were offerings and prayers from Buddhist monks; speeches, songs, and skits on Ambedkar's life; food and dancing. Ambedkar's Jayanti is judged by many to be the biggest yearly celebration in Bidar.
    The influence of Ambedkar among all Dalit communities in the district is very strong, which leads to personal, group and caste empowerment on the one hand; and a backlash by caste Hindus against Dalits on the other hand. As the subjects of caste oppression, Dalit women are actively constructing new forms of caste identities and cultural empowerment through the celebration of Ambedkar's life in song, dance and ceremonies, and by pursuing his call for education. One NFE teacher illustrates this point by leading her students in the following song:
It is a sun on Baba Ambedkar
In my spirit, I will say Baba, Baba only
I will go after him and garland him
And he will look after us
Always I will be calling his name
    The Nag Panchammi celebration honours Panchamma who is the most popular Dalit and Sudra goddess in Karnataka. She is the goddess who protects and cures people from all kinds of diseases. And unlike Hindu goddesses, Panchamma is independent of men and does not have a husband. In Bidar district, it was observed that near every village there is a small Panchamma temple, but it is not the object of daily rituals performed by priest.     Indeed, the people communicate with the goddess directly by talking to her, without the mediation of a priest. Once a year, all the Dalit and Sudra sub-castes go to the temple with pots of sweet rice, wash the small stone that represent the deity, and clean the temple and its surroundings. This day is meaningful for Dalit women as many return to their natal villages to celebrate the yearly Nag Panchammi celebration.
    Asked to describe the typical ceremonies of SC people in the village in the village, AE teacher Chitrama describes the death ritual as follows,
They bury the dead. Some elders would read from the Buddhist literature, then they put the mud on the grave.
This section reveals some of the contradictory elements of Dalit cultures, which can serve as both a form of compliance and resistance to mainstream Hindu cultures. This has several implications for education among Dalits, discussed in the next section.

Caste and Learning
    The data reveals that caste is very important to female's participation in rural education programs in the villages. For example, Tulsama, a crèche teacher for four years, reports, "in our village, there is casteism, so only the Christians and SCs will come to the Sangha and crèche”. Tulsama's statement suggest that either non-Dalit women have no use of MSK's educational programs in the village, or due to the large presence of Dalits in these programs, non-Dalits refuses to participate in them.
    In answer to the question, "what problems do you have in your work?" Sahayogini Kanthamma mentions that gaining the people's trust is an important problem. She explains,
I did not face any caste problems, but other Sahayoginis have faced this problem. I did not have a problem because I go only to the SC colony. In the Sangha in my ten villages, there are SC, ST, Christians and Muslims.
As Kanthamma states, being an SC herself, she does not have any caste problems because she "only go to the SC colony”. Her statement that casteism is not practised among the SC, ST, Christians and Muslims who attended the Sangha in ten villages indicates that there may be some forms of anti-caste solidarity among various oppressed groups at the village level.
    Nonetheless, Kanthamma is an exception as only a few of the twenty Sahayoginis are SCs; the others were from mostly Lingayat and other Hindu castes. Kanthamma suggests that these women face "caste problems”, that is, difficulties in building trust with Dalit women in the villages they are assigned to organise. It is significant to note that in Kanthamma's ten villages, none of the caste Hindu or Lingayat women attend Sangha meetings; in this sense, the term Dalit can be used to refer to SC, ST, Christian and Muslim groups, who are included, and excluded at the same time, by joining the Sangha.
    In answer to the question, "will different castes of people come to the AE class and Sangha?" Ghallemma, a Dalit Christian, describes how Madigas came to dominate the Sangha in her village,
Two, three Christians will come, and the remaining are Madigas. The Muslims are far from us, so they don't come to us. In the beginning, the Sangha was made in the SC colony, but the SCs did not like it. Sahayoginis went to the SC colony for six months, but those people never agreed to come to these meetings for two, three days. They were not interested. They the Sahayoginis came to us, the Christians and Madigas, and we agreed to have the Sangha. The SC were not interested in the Sangha and we did not take them because of some casteism.
    As Ghallemma indicate, Dalits are very divided in the rural village context. In her village, the Dalits are divided along religious lines, between Hindu Dalits and Christian Dalits. Madigas in the district are considered as half-Christian and half-Dalit. It is significant to note that in her comments regarding SCs, for example, "the SCs did not like it”, Ghallemma does not refer to term "SC women”, but to "SCs”, meaning women and men. This suggest that SC men do play a part in SC women's decisions to become involved, or not involved, with the MSK program.
    Her observation that SC women "were not interested" furthermore hints at the fact that because of their extreme poverty, SC women may have found it even more difficult to leave the village for two, three days to attend MSK meetings, than Christian and Madiga women. Her remarks moreover suggests that the program functionaries may be contributing to creating differences between the two Dalit communities in Ghallemma's village, by attempting to organise one colony at a time, and by switching to another colony after six months. Ghallemma describes the differences between the communities further,
The SC people quarrel and they have a big quarrel with us. They want to keep the Sangha instrument (harmonium). They say that we get all the help from the government.
    These last statements suggest that the program was fuelling rivalry between SCs and Madigas/Christians. The harmonium provided by MSK to the village Sangha becomes a hugely contested issue between the two groups. Because MSK is now working with the Christians and Madigas, the SCs, who were initially reluctant to become involved, now feel that they are being further deprived of the limited resources provided as part of the program. They want to keep the harmonium, because they feel it is the only benefit made available to them so far.
    According to the data, caste do influence respondents' attitudes towards education. A case in point, Christian and Buddhist families place greater emphasis on education for young women than Madiga and Holeya groups. This conclusion agrees with the Pawde’s finding that converted Dalit women, Buddhist and Christian, are more conscious than “Hindu” Dalit women in every stream of awareness (Pawde 1995). This points to the fact that Dalits vary in terms of their perception of education as a valuable path of upward social mobility, availability of tradition of education, and the existence of education oriented sub-culture among them (Viswanathan and Reddy 1985).

Change in Caste Status Among Dalit Women
    Both women and men are the products of their socialisation and outgrowths of the various contexts in which they are born. Rural Dalit females' sense of self is formed by learned cultural and social norms which encourage them to accept their ascribed roles and identities, such as employment as low paid agricultural workers; roles as wives and mothers in child bearing and rearing; and conveyors of household production. What continues to be unknown is women's existing and potential for resisting the prescribed order, and the infinite ways in which women can modify the prescribed order and assume agency by whatever means possible. Two authors of a recent study, Ginwalla and Ramanathan (1996:40) write:
We maintain that rural women have in their unnoticed ways formed their own critique of the discourses controlling them and embodied them in practices which the academician/activist may not always readily recognise. This is not to say that they consciously rebel against the shaping milieu, but rather that they receive, and secretly alter it, that they are both active and passive, that the cultural world pressing down on them is sometimes covertly resisted.
    The Mahila Samakhya Sangha program is an important arena in which the resistance described above has a chance to develop. The MSK program offers Dalit women the opportunity to share a new space away from men, and the chance to interact with each other much more freely than they can in their homes and villages. Some of these changes in caste identity among respondents may be viewed as a result of interventions by, and women's participation in, the MSK program various educational activities and training. Participating in the program leads to new forms of learning and contributes to agency among respondents. For instance, literacy now means that Dalit women are no longer easily deceived by caste Hindu landowners, farmers, shopkeepers, and money lenders, as discussed in chapter five and six.
    However, caste empowerment among respondents is also partly the result of a more long term process of caste consciousness, or Ambedkarism, which is leading to enhanced self respect, changed social roles, and new cultural options among Dalits, as discussed previously in this chapter. This socio-cultural empowerment is not part of the formal avenues of learning, such as literacy programs or schools.
    In contrast to formal and nonformal avenues of education, Ambedkarism is the result of non-literate traditions, oral practices, folk music and culture, village skits, street theatre, role plays, popular songs, and so on. Ambedkar placed great importance on education for Dalits, and knowledge of his life and achievements is leading to increased interest in education and cultural empowerment among respondents.
    One indication of how Dalit women's agency and caste empowerment are occurring as a process of their participation in the MSK program is that at large MSK meetings and monthly training in the district, caste constraints appear to have diminished significance as women from different SC and ST groups live and work closely together for several days at a time. The women talk about problems they are having as teachers and Sangha members, as well as compose and sing songs together, perform in skits about domestic violence and girls' education, have lunch and tea together, exchange gifts, and take care of each other's children.
    The women will not only discuss MSK business, but usually talk about shared concerns of shelter, work, food, clothing, health, pregnancies, deliveries, and child rearing. By participating in mixed caste groups and ignoring social pressures to maintain caste purity/pollution norms, these women's actions may be viewed as caste empowerment and active resistance against casteism.
    There are many other examples of this process of caste empowerment and active resistance to casteism among respondents: a few women mention that in their villages, a wide variety of caste groups participate in MSK program activities; another respondent indicates, "now there are all types of jatis (sub-castes) in the Sangha"; and one Sahayogini insist that the women in some villages went "from sitting separate in meetings, to sitting together and visiting each other's houses”. As further evidence of this, participant observation of Sangha meetings in the villages reveal that a small number of Sanghas bring together women from SC, tribal, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, and caste Hindu groups.
    Caste empowerment among respondents involves much more than resistance to restrictions regarding eating and association with other groups. It includes changes in self perception and thinking about the world; for instance, a few older women declared, "now I am not scared of banamati anymore”, Caste empowerment also includes changes in important social institutions such as family and marriage, as one Sahayogini describe that in her village a marriage occurred between a Christian Dalit girl and a Muslim boy. Since both of their mothers are members of the village Sangha, the women collectively decided to pay for the marriage.
    Opposition to the unjust caste system is closely related to caste empowerment among Dalits as all of the respondents are extremely critical of casteism. One of the woman who serves as a Sangha leader explained that when they were starting the women's sangha in the village, they invited all the women to join; however, "we said, if you have casteism, then please don't join us”. Another female declares, "there should not be any high or low caste”, and one more critiques, "why do we have caste?" When queried about views towards caste Hindus, one woman proclaims, "I feel equal to them”, and another pronounce, "I will not show them any prescribed form of respect”. After being refused entry into a Hindu temple, one respondent admits, "I never went back to that temple again”.
    Many respondents express an awareness of themselves as a caste oppressed group. To cite an instance, one young woman remarks, "I don't want the people in my village to be harassed by the Gowdas (caste Hindu landowners)”. This respondent's resistance to gender and caste oppression is discussed in the case study at the end of chapter six. Other Dalit respondents likewise report that they are refusing to abide by caste Hindu customs which reinforce their subordinate status, such as the lowering of their heads or showing other forms of deference and respect to caste Hindus, and observing outward symbols of Untouchable status like the wearing of a rice bag over the head.
    In the same way, fifty year old Ghallemma explain caste empowerment in her village:
In the beginning, there was casteism problems. The Marathi-speaking people were there. When SC people use to go to the tea stall, they used to give the tea from far, and use clay cups. So the SCs broke all the cups. Now casteism is slowly going out.
As Ghallemma states, there is casteism, but Dalits are also actively resisting casteism and economic exploitation in her village. The caste Hindu tea stall owners refused to serve Dalits in their glass cups, and would be careful not to touch the disposable clay cups into which they pour tea "from far" to serve Dalits. Dalit customers actively resisted this observance of "untouchability" and broke all the clay cups, thereby forcing the owners to serve them in glass cups. Ghallemma implies that because of such acts of resistance, "casteism is slowly going out”.
    One older respondent who had been involved with MSK for five years as a Sangha leader, Chandarma, was asked to comment on how social relations had changed in her village for her as a Dalit and she recalls one example of her caste empowerment:
My brother had some quarrel with the Hindu neighbours. When I heard about this I went to the police inspector. The people say, "how she is so bold to talk to the police”. So I said, "they are like my brothers”. I said hello to him and told him that the women used to quarrel for water and then the Jains ("upper" caste Hindus) came and beat my brother. They are rich, and they used to brush their teeth and place their brush in our clean water, so how can we stay quiet? He said, "that is wrong”. Then he asked me where I learned all this, to talk. I told him about Bidar MSK and so on. Even my brother said I was bold to talk to the police. They have stopped doing that to us and we don't quarrel anymore.
    This respondent provides a vivid portrait of the kinds of female Dalit caste empowerment occurring in Bidar. Using her contacts with MSK to break the cycle of isolation and oppression of Dalits in her village, Chandarma reaches out to the police and informs them of a problem in the village. As a fellow employee of the state, through her employment as a Crèche teacher with MSK, Chandarma considers the police as her "brothers" and much less a threat. She refuses to accept the inferior roles assigned to male and female Dalits in her village and seeks out justice. This incident hints at the importance of outside linkages for the empowerment of Dalit women.
    The declarations and stories above are substantial since they are articulated expressions of indignation. Through they may not constitute an actual resistance movement, they are evidence that Dalit women (i) understand the caste mechanisms which place limits and boundaries on them; and (ii) feel indignant about these mechanisms and express open resentment through they may not (or cannot) act on them. However dissatisfaction can breed dissent and, ultimately, change. These statements indicate that rural Dalit female respondents have not only recognise the need for change, but are actively rejecting and modifying their sense of self and personal identities in regards to their inferior position in the caste Hindu social structure, and are working on bringing changes in the various contexts of their lives.
    Despite the lack of attention paid to caste issues by the program, Dalit participants are straightforwardly including caste and cultural issues as part of their learning and teaching. To cite an instance, participant observation at Sangha meetings, AE and NFE classes, and at MSK's meetings and training, the women and girls usually sing songs about Ambedkar and others songs about oppression, like the famous African American spiritual, "We Shall Overcome”. Several skits performed by the Kendra students include issues of caste discrimination that Dalits have to face in obtaining water, employment, and education.
    Dalit women are on the receiving end of violence perpetuated by the state, communalist and fundamentalist forces (Chhachhi 1989; Kannibaran and Kannibaran 1991; Kapur and Cossman 1993; Qadeer 1988). Any form of upward social mobility of Dalits is often accompanied by caste violence and riots (Bose 1985; Punalekar 1980), and in many cases, Dalit women are the first victims. In order to terrorize the whole caste, caste Hindu men, very often with the connivance of police, rape, even gang-rape, Dalit women. In addition, caste Hindu policemen customarily take advantage and falsely implicate Dalit women in criminal cases and rape them while in detention (Das 1995:74).
    One woman Dalit writer observes:
Rape works as a weapon against the woman as well as her husband, whichever of the two is politically targeted, but it is also the least reported of all the atrocities against the Dalits (Balagopal 1991:2400).
In 1991, the number of women who faced the torture of rape was estimated at two million, and the majority of the victims were Dalit or tribal (Gandhi and Shah 1991; Mathew 1994). However, rape of Dalit women may not even be considered as rape because of the customary access that the "upper" caste men have had to Dalit women's sexuality (Rege 1995).
    An early program administrator describe one incident in 1991 of caste Hindu backlash against a Dalit girl involved with MSK in Bidar:
A girl was raped on the 7th of February. We did a march in the village where the incident occurred. We had a slogan, "When one woman is raped, all women are raped”. All the (MSK) women came with their men, there were over 300 women with 50 to 60 men. There was one more good slogan, "Rape is violence against a human being”. and another which said, "Women is human first, then wife, mother and daughter”.
This incident illustrates that rape is used as a tool of oppression against assertive Dalit women and any program that intends to "empower" them. The way the incident is depicted by the program official is interesting in what it reveals and what it does not. While this administrator describes the rape of a Dalit child as a form of gender oppression and resistance, she ignores completely its caste dimensions.
    The combination of gender and caste oppression energised this issue, and brought Dalit women and men together in a way they had not done before, to demand that caste Hindu men respect Dalit women as human beings. The hands-off approach adopted by MSK officials typifies the Indian state's response to violence against Dalit women. Although they are once again denied justice by the police and courts in this case, the peaceful protest of women and men acts as a warning to the dominant Hindu community in the district that Dalits are not submitting to Hindu patriarchy over Dalit women.

Sundaramma - A Case Study
    Dalit female resistance to gender, caste and class injustice takes many forms, from overt challenge to covert resistance. One common form of resistance participant observation reveals among some women is the refusal to observe rituals, specifically the veiling of the face in the presence of males (Laaj Kaadhvi), and the lowering of the head in the presence of the "high" castes. These ritual observances are social constructions which equate female virtue with modesty, as well as gestures of respect and obedience to (superior) males and "high" castes, and markers of inferior subject positions.
    There are in addition, more overt forms of resistance occurring as one respondent, Sundaramma, spells out:
Two years back, in Beldal village, there was a piece of open land not belonging to anyone. The sangha women wanted to build a sangha hut on that piece of open land, but they were having some problems in getting the permission, and so on. Still, they decided to go ahead and they brought the sand, mud, bricks, etc., and were about to build it.
    Sundaramma continues her story:
Next to the open piece of land, there was a house of the rich farmer. One night, the son of the old farmer went and killed the farmer and threw his body into the open land. In the morning, he went to the police and said, "the sangha women killed my father as we were protesting against them not to build their hut”. Then the police got all of the (SC) women and men of the village and put them in jail.
The above statements exposes some of the caste opposition which rural Dalit women must deal with in trying to become involved with a development project, including the retaliation of caste Hindus who are determined to maintain residential segregation from Dalits. The actions of this farmer's son reveal just how adamant the rich and powerful are in their efforts to prevent rural Dalit women from building their Sanghas next to them. The rich farmer's son used the women as an excuse to kill his father and inherit his property, as well as implicate all Dalits in the village in the murder.
    Sundaramma's statements moreover disclose the complicity between the police and the rich farmers in the rural areas. Without any prior investigation, the Dalit women were assumed to be guilty and two of their husbands were locked up. The police did not give any importance to the Dalit village women's side of the issue, their relationship to MSK, the application they made for the land, the materials they brought, and so on.
    The Dalit men's incarceration served as a focal issue to mobilise Dalit women throughout the district, as Sundaramma explains:
Then the sangha women from all over Bidar district, ten from each village, 186 villages total, came together and held a march for the release of the sangha women and their husbands from the police. Sahayoginis and MSK co-ordinators did not come, only we women came, and we made a procession against the police, that we wanted justice. They were all released and we got justice. They locked up one man for six months and two men for eight months. They were released.
It is significant to note that after three Dalit men were locked up, Sundaramma and the other Dalit women decided to organise themselves independent of the program, and without the help of MSK staff. The program and staff had no clear procedures in this situation and indecision lead to inaction. Perhaps, this incident was viewed by functionaries as having the potential of "cooling women off" from growing aspirations regarding the program.
    Nonetheless, it was clear from the start to Dalit women involved with the program in the district, that the imprisonment of sangha women's husbands was a Dalit issue, that is, Dalit men were being punished for the empowerment Dalit women. The women mobilised themselves immediately and protested for months until the three Dalit men were released.
    In answer to the question, "what happened to the farmer's son?" Sundaramma continues:
Later on, he admitted that he killed his father. He is in the village still and never went to jail. He might have given bribes to remain free. His father was not well, he was old and about to die. The son wanted to take the whole land, so he decided to do what he did. The sangha hut never got built.
As Sundaramma indicates, the issue of justice in the village is related to power. By committing murder, the rich son was able to get everything he wanted: residential segregation, "the whole land”, his sick father dead, and no jail time. The Dalits got more problems, but little in terms of benefits and support from the MSK program.
    Both of the above incidents of rape and false accusation are considered as atrocities under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, yet MSK staff did not help the women to file these cases with the State government or special courts set up to investigate caste abuses against Dalits. Neither have program staff done anything against other atrocities covered under existing laws like the many cases of bonded labour present in the district. The lack of response in addressing caste issues exposes a caste bias present in the program, which is symptomatic of many women’s groups refusal to help Dalit program participants access resources which are provided to them as a disadvantaged caste.
    Even though there was no Sangha ever built, the women’s "successful" resistance served to instil confidence and caste pride among the Dalit women involved. The women's actions demonstrate that large-scale structures of domination are never total, and there is always a space, in this case a Sangha without a hut, "outside the immediate control of the dominant... where, in principle, a shared critique of domination may develop" (Scott 1990:xi).

Conclusion
    The Mahila Samakhya Karnataka program policy and implementation, in the name of focusing on disadvantaged women's empowerment, fails to recognise caste and other social aspects of their lives, which indicate a one-dimensional approach to empowerment, similar to a sectoral approach to development. Dalit women encounter social, economic and gender discrimination by virtue of their caste, and consequently caste issues are far more weighty on them than gender issues. For instance, educated Dalit women still confront institutionalised employment discrimination applied towards the "lower" castes and Dalits in both the public and private sectors. While the MSK program's emphasis on gender concerns is laudable, a more comprehensive approach to women's empowerment should include an understanding of their social, cultural and economic issues as well.
    In contrast, respondents are aware of their multiple gender, caste and class oppressions, and even though they may be nonliterate and lacking in economic resources, they are experiencing gender and caste empowerment. Despite further attempts by caste Hindus to maintain the status quo in regards to Dalits' inferior status in the social order, some Dalit women are determined to change their subordinated role.
    Separate and distinct from Hindu cultures, Dalit cultures serve as a source of strength for Dalit women to resist Hindu hegemony and their ascribed status as "Untouchables”. The teachings of Ambedkar is further acting as a vibrant foundation for respondents' caste empowerment, inside and beyond the context of the program. Dalit women may not be able to read and write, and there is no formal program to provide them with social and cultural education, nevertheless they can sing songs about Ambedkar, his journey to America, attendance at Columbia University, and various academic degrees. In this way Dalits are using Ambedkar as a way of opting out of the Hindu caste system, and its' imposed karma and dharma; as well as a means for pulling themselves up the social ladder.